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ABSTRACT 
Martin Piotrowski 
Migration and Household Demography in Nang Rong, Thailand 
 
 
Under the Direction of Ronald R. Rindfuss 
 
    This work investigates various facets of migration and household demography in Thailand, 
a developing country that has been experiencing a shift from a rural subsistence economy to 
an urban industrial base. The setting is Nang Rong, a rural agrarian district located in 
Buriram province in the Northeast. At one time a frontier region, the district has been 
undergoing tremendous social, economic, and demographic transformations in the last three 
decades.  
    The first analytical portion of the work deals with care for children of absent migrant  
parents. I develop a model of total childcare, whereby someone other than a biological parent 
assumes total parental responsibility in the parents’ absence. I describe a process whereby a 
mutually-beneficial intergenerational household division of labor develops in which the older 
generation cares for the children of absent migrant parents, who provide for economic needs 
of their origin households.  
    Next, using help with harvesting rice as an illustration of the profound changes that occur 
during the industrial transition, I examine intergenerational relations between young out-
migrants and their parents. I find that migrants are more likely to help with the rice harvest if 
their origin household owns securely titled land, and if the migrant has lower human capital 
endowments. Results suggest that intergenerational relations between parents and children 
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are becoming more instrumental, which is related to a household strategy predicated on 
individual self-interest and bargaining.  
    The final analytical chapter deals with the effect of remittances on household division, a 
demographic process that is understudied in rural developing contexts. Results suggest that 
remittance money sent by other household members (especially women, who perhaps are 
siblings of those who eventually move) is used to finance a household split. This is 
potentially related to the effect that remittances have on alleviating credit constraints, which 
makes it possible for families and households to fund costs (such as home construction) 
associated with movement into an independent household. Remittance effects are particularly 
associated with a later stage in the Thai household life cycle whereby a young couple moves 
out of the household of the wife’s family into an independent nuclear household. 
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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
    In much of the Western world, the 19th and 20th centuries brought about massive social, 
demographic, and economic changes, including the shift to an industrial economy, 
urbanization, and relatively smaller populations in developed countries (Caldwell 2004, 
Coleman 1993, Thornton 2001). While these large-scale structural changes have largely 
become subjects of interest of today’s historians, in many developing countries such 
transformations are now impacting people’s lives.  
    This is certainly true in Nang Rong, Thailand, the setting for my dissertation research. 
Nang Rong is a small rural, agrarian district located in the Buriram province in the Northeast 
region. Nang Rong was an isolated frontier region until the 1970s. In recent decades 
development efforts such as road construction, electrification, and telecommunications 
improvements changed the lives of many residents. Despite the tremendous changes 
occurring in the last few decades, Nang Rong remains a marginal environment where 
villagers, whose primary economic activity is rice farming, struggle to carve out an existence 
amidst poor soils and unpredictable rains. In many ways, changes in Nang Rong reflect the 
influence of broader development efforts and macro-structural changes at the national level. 
    Thailand has been experiencing massive transformations in its demographic structure and 
economy. In the decades between 1960 and the late 1980s Thailand underwent a 
demographic transition whereby a decline in mortality was followed by a decline in fertility 
(Hutaserani and Roumasset 1991). While the crude death rate in Thailand had been steadily 
declining since the 1920s, child and infant mortality, an important component of mortality 
decline, only began to see a significant reduction since 1960 (Knodel et al. 1987).  
    In 1970, a National Family Planning Program was formally established under the auspices 
of the Ministry of Public Health. By the end of 1971, birth control pills and condoms, a rarity 
at one time, became widely available throughout rural areas (Knodel et al. 1987). The 
eventual result of the Thai government’s efforts to raise standards of living and limit family 
size was a decline in fertility. The fertility rate began to fall precipitously between 1960 and 
the late 1980s. Estimates of the total fertility rate range from 6.5 to 7.4 births per women in 
the early 1960s. By 1975 the TFR was just above four births per women and by the late 
1980s it was below replacement levels (Hirschman et al. 1994). Because of changes in the 
population age structure, the population grew. Consequently Thais tend to have sizeable 
families, and young adult Thais have substantial numbers of siblings. 
    Throughout the last half-century, Thailand also began experiencing a change in its rural 
and urban composition. Figure 1.1, which presents data from the World Bank’s World 
Development Indicators (WDI), shows an approximate ten percent decline in the proportional 
representation of the country’s rural population and a corresponding increase in the 
proportional representation of the urban population. With almost 70 percent of its population 
living in the hinterland, Thailand still remains a predominantly rural country. However, the 
aggregate numbers hide a complexity of back-and-forth movement that characterizes the life 
of some rural residents who migrate periodically between rural villages and urban settings.  
    The timing of the rural-urban shift corresponds to a change in historical migration patterns. 
During the period between 1975-1980, a decline in rural-to-rural migration occurred in 
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tandem with an increase in rural-to-urban migration streams and counter-streams (Goldstein 
1987, Pejaranonda et al. 1995). This time period also experienced a growing volume and 
higher rate of circular migration (Goldstein, 1987). Circular migration, as well as other types 
of seasonal migration, is often carried out in conjunction with variations in agricultural labor 
demands. During the agricultural seasons when labor demand is low, migrants often flock to 
Bangkok in search of work, with flows being particularly heavy during the dry season 
(Chamratrithirong et al. 1995, Pejaranonda et al. 1995, Richter et al. 1997). 
    The Northeast region, where Nang Rong is located, is the dominant supplier of migrants 
(Chamratrithirong et al. 1995, Goldstein 1987, Pejaranonda et al. 1995). Thai migration 
scholars cite a number of reasons for this prevalence, including the lack of availability of 
rural land for settlement, the success of family planning (Goldstein 1987), development 
efforts which raised aspirations for non-agricultural employment, improved transportation 
and information networks which increasingly link the Northeast and Bangkok, and the 
mechanization of agriculture (Pejaranonda et al. 1995).  
    While some, or perhaps all, of these factors have affected migration patterns, most Nang 
Rong residents I spoke to during my fieldwork in 2005 complained about the lack of local 
wage labor positions, the rising costs of living corresponding to a shift to a money economy. 
They pointed to greater opportunities for work outside of the district as the major impetus for 
the movement of young people. Rural-urban differentials in economic growth are associated 
with disparate opportunity structures, which are related to historical developments in 
Thailand’s economy, much of which favored metropolitan Bangkok (Ayal 1992). 
    Thailand’s economy showed considerable growth in the 1980s and 1990s. Thanks largely 
to a boom in manufacturing, construction, agro-industry, and tourism, Thailand’s economy 
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greatly improved in the ten years before the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997 (MacDonald 
1998). Figure 1.2 shows that Thailand’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita (measured 
in constant 1995 international dollars1) increased from around 2,000 in 1980 to a peak of 
over 6,000 in the late 1990s. During this time, the percent of the population employed in 
agriculture declined by about 15 percent, while the percent of the population employed in the 
industry and service sectors increased by approximately the same percentage (see Figure 
1.3). 
    Taking these shifts in economic development and population structure as the contextual 
backdrop of my research, I examine how migrants and their origin households in rural 
agrarian villages cope with the changes brought about by out-migration. These changes have 
greatly impacted the nature of family and household relationships throughout Nang Rong. 
Using data that span the time period between 1984 to 2000, I focus on three aspects of family 
life that are changing in reaction to the selective migration of household members: 1) care for 
children of absent migrant parents by extended household members, 2) help with agricultural 
labor (in the form of help with the rice harvest) provided by migrants to their origin 
household, and 3) the effect of migrant remittances on household splitting. 
    To examine care for children of absent migrant parents, I develop a model of total 
childcare, whereby someone other than the biological parents assumes total parental 
responsibility in the parents’ absence. This pattern of childcare is different from the pattern 
generally found in developed countries, where children are cared for by formal daycare 
professionals, only when their parents are working. Due to the location of jobs as well as the 
availability and cost of daycare, many parents migrate to Bangkok and other cities in search 
                                                 
1 Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita is based on purchasing power parity (PPP). PPP GDP is converted 
to international dollars using purchasing power parity rates. An international dollar has the same purchasing 
power over GDP as the U.S. dollar has in the United States (World Bank 2005). 
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of work while leaving their children behind at origin. Non-familial child care institutions 
have not yet matured in Thailand and parents rely on the children’s grandparents and 
extended kin for aid. This is a pattern found in many developing countries (Hashimoto 1991, 
Kinsella 2000, Knodel and Saengtienchai 2005, Oburu and Palmerus 2005).  
    Using a combination of qualitative primary data and quantitative secondary data I 
investigate the role of kin in caring for the children of migrant parents. I find that the 
availability of extended kin, especially maternal grandmothers, makes it possible for migrant 
parents to live apart from their children. The importance of maternal grandmothers is 
probably connected with traditional customs encouraging matrilocal postnuptial residence. 
     My next chapter investigates impacts on rural areas during a country’s transition from 
rural subsistence to urban industrial, using help with harvesting rice as an illustration of the 
profound changes that occur. Rice is central to the economy of Nang Rong and its harvesting 
is labor intensive. Harvesting must occur in a short time frame, and household members 
sometimes need help from migrants to complete the harvest, otherwise they risk diminished 
yields. Nang Rong out-migrants are young adults. Their parents are approaching ages where 
it becomes progressively more difficult to do physically-demanding agricultural labor. 
Hence, rice harvest help from migrants impacts intergenerational relations between adult 
children and their parents.  
    I investigate several theories about household strategies for adult migrants and their 
parents. I find most support for a power and bargaining model. If the household owns 
securely titled land, migrants are much more likely to return and help with the rice harvest. If 
the migrant has more human capital, then they are less likely to return and help, suggesting 
they are pursuing self-interested strategies. This implies that intergenerational relations 
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between parents and children are becoming more instrumental, which is related to a loss of 
interdependency among family members. Migrants depend on non-familial institutions, such 
as their place of employment, which competes with the family as a source of property and 
security. 
    My next chapter deals with households splitting into two or more households. In more 
developed countries, an upsurge in real income, a rise in living standards, and a general 
process of individualization have been linked to a general decrease in the size of households. 
Frequently it is young people who experience residential changes. Most young people who 
moved into new households do so by living independently from family members.  
    While much research exists in developed countries, this topic remains under-researched in 
developing countries experiencing economic transitions. I link existing literature on the 
process of household change to research on migrant remittances. Remittances are an 
invaluable source of capital which rural households use to alleviate poverty and overcome 
severe credit constraints in contexts where local wage employment opportunities are limited 
or absent. Remittances are a form of income which can raise standards of living and create 
aspirations for privacy and separate living. 
    I find that remittances sent from migrants to households are a significant determinant of 
household splits, particularly for couples at later stages of the household lifecycle. This is 
reasonable, since these couples must finance their move out of a vertically extended 
household into an independent nuclear household. A further finding is that household splits 
are sensitive to the remittances of women, not men. Because remittances from women are 
thought to be motivated by altruism, the gender effect is consistent with a theory of 
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households as corporate actors who allocate wealth across family members according to the 
efforts of a benevolent household head. 
    The most obvious theme uniting my analytical chapters is the influence of migration on 
households and on family life. Migration creates challenges for migrant parents and elderly 
grandparents, who frequently care for their grandchildren. It separates former and current 
household members. This separation makes it difficult for migrants to balance obligations to 
family members at origin with new family and non-family obligations at destination. It puts 
pressure on household members to replace household labor that could have come from 
migrants. Migration also brings remittances, which can lift capital constraints and raise 
standards of living. This enables individuals to afford new amenities like privacy and 
personal space. 
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CHAPTER II 
MIGRATION AND CARE FOR CHILDREN IN NANG RONG 
 
 
    As societies transition from a rural agrarian base to an urban industrial economy, the role 
of mother and the role of worker become more difficult to combine. Prior to industrialization, 
mothers and fathers could care for children (by watching them and being available for 
emergencies) while engaging in productive labor. Non-mechanized agriculture and 
piecework was combined with child supervision with less concern of discernible loss of 
productivity or danger to the child (Degler 1980, Roos 1985, Stycos and Weller 1967). As 
the industrialization process proceeds, societies experience a number of interrelated changes 
and dislocations that make the role of mother and the role of worker increasingly 
incompatible (Brewster and Rindfuss 2000, Presser 1986, Weller 1977).  
    The process of mechanization brings machines whose presence on worksites poses a 
danger to young children. With economic development, agricultural work is replaced by 
work in manufacturing and service industries, and it begins to be located at a distance from 
the home. Parents must commute or even migrate away in order to participate in the paid 
labor force. Work schedules in these new industries are set by employers, and they lack the 
flexibility required for raising children. The presence of children at work jeopardizes 
productivity, making it necessary for children to be cared for away from the work place 
(Brewster and Rindfuss 2000).  
    Usually caring for children is the responsibility of women, and women who want to 
participate in the workforce are forced to make provisions to have someone care for their 
children. The literature on childcare in settings that are transitioning from an agrarian 
economy to an industrial economy has identified two types of childcare arrangements. The 
first I refer to as daycare, whereby someone other than the biological mother (or father) takes 
care of the child while the mother is at work. The second, which I refer to as total care, 
involves the care of the child by someone other than the biological mother (and father) when 
the mother is at work as well as when she is not working.  
    Daycare is common in any industrialized society and has received a great deal of attention 
in the literature (see for example Gordon and Chase-Landale 2001, Hofferth and Philips 
1987, Johansen et al. 1996, Zylan 2000). Literature on total care is less common. Total care 
is likely to be found in societies with high levels of labor migration that are in the mist of 
economic transition and lack formal childcare institutions. In some of these settings families 
adapt to changing economic circumstances by having the mother and father migrate. The 
parents’ relatives provide care for the children who remain in the rural origin area. 
    In this paper I examine total care for the children of migrant parents in a developing region 
that has experienced a transformation in its economic base. The setting is Nang Rong, a rural, 
agrarian district located in Thailand’s Northeast region. I use data from a rural-based sample 
of an ongoing longitudinal survey in Nang Rong to show interconnections among a changing 
economy, migration as an adjustment to economic changes, intergenerational linkages, and 
needs associated with care for children. Total care arrangements are an important facilitating 
mechanism in the transition from rural agrarian societies to those that are urban and 
industrialized. 
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Childcare in Developing Countries 
    Most literature on childcare in settings experiencing societal changes related to 
industrialization (mechanization, urbanization, etc.) comes from developing countries rather 
than historical studies. The focus of this literature is on daycare rather than on total care. Two 
theoretical approaches influence most attempts to examine it in developing countries: role 
theory and household economic theory (Short et al. 2002). Both focus on the incompatibility 
that women face in dealing with their role as mothers and as workers. 
    Mothers’ role conflict is manifest either in a diminution in working hours or a decrease in 
time spent rearing children. Empirical evidence that mothers reduce their number of working 
hours in wage labor comes from a number of urban settings, including metropolitan Brazil 
(Connelly et al. 1996), the Philippines (Adair et al. 2002), and China (Entwisle and Chen 
2002). Research in Malaysia, India, the West Indies, Guatemala, and Nepal also suggests that 
non-wage agricultural work can be incompatible with childcare (DaVanzo and Lee 1983, 
Desai and Jain 1994, Gordon 1987, Hallman et al. 2005, Levine 1988). The finding that 
women reduce their hours of childcare as a result of their work schedule comes mainly from 
Short et al.’s (2002) research in China.  
    Role theory tends to focus on the strategies that women use to combine the mother and 
worker roles (Korinek 2004, Mason and Palan 1981, Stycos and Weller 1967). Research 
from the Caribbean and parts of Asia has found that the need for financial resources and the 
necessity for mothers to become income providers results in wage employment becoming a 
defining feature of motherhood (Garcia and de Oliveira 1997, Korinek 2004, Yu 2001). 
Instead of reducing their workload, mothers give up rest or leisure time and take on a double 
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or triple burden (Chant 2002, DaVanzo and Lee 1983, Desai and Jain 1994, Folbre 1984, 
Isvan 1991, Korinek 2004, Tiefenthaler 1997).  
    Household economic theory also focuses on the incompatibility between work and 
childrearing, but it tends to highlight the different opportunity costs of childrearing for men 
and women. Becker (1993) argues that physical differences between men and women, largely 
related to reproductive functions (breastfeeding, delivering babies), cause women to spend 
more of their lifetimes engaged in activities like childrearing. Men spend more time in 
market activities. In order to maximize utility, each sex capitalizes on its greater proclivity in 
the household and market sectors. Women invest mainly in developing skills and knowledge 
aimed at raising household efficiency while men invest in activities and skills that raise 
market efficiency (ibid). 
    The literature on total care examines role incompatibility from a different perspective than 
the literature on daycare. It describes circumstances under which the role of parent is 
assumed by someone other than the biological mother (or father). Those who have studied it 
in developed countries describe a residential pattern known as the “skipped generation” 
household in which grandparents are the primary care provider and neither parent is present 
(Casper and Bryson 1998, Simmons and Dye 2003).  
    In developing countries, the skipped generation household is associated with rural-to-
urban migration. Migration in these areas is frequently an adjustment to or an attempt to 
participate in economic transition. According to UN estimates, in 2003, about 40 percent of 
the total population of less developed regions was living in urban areas, and this percentage 
is expected to grow to 65 percent by 2030 (United Nations 2003). As standards of living 
increase, and as monetized goods become increasingly available, people migrate from rural 
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areas to earn money in non-agricultural employment sectors concentrated primarily in cities 
(McDonald and Kippen 2001, Roberts 1997).  
    In developing countries, formal childcare options, themselves the product of economic 
transition, sometimes remain underdeveloped. Much of the most trusted, affordable, and 
adequate childcare still comes from traditional sources, notably kin living in rural areas 
(Richter 1997). Faced with the pressures of meeting economic necessities, parents living in 
these rural settings often have to make the difficult choice of migrating to urban areas while 
leaving their children in the care of extended kin (Richter 1996, Schoder-Butterfill 2004).  
    The focus of the literature on total care necessarily goes beyond the narrow focus on the 
role of the mother, and it pays considerable attention to the influence of a larger household 
context. Scholars working in developing regions of Africa and Asia view the skipped 
generation household as an example of a household strategy, in which household members 
cooperate to maximize utility (Bledsoe and Isiugo-Abanihe 1989, Lee 2000, Peterson 1993, 
Richter 1996).  
    Spatially-separated household members develop a division of labor in which the middle 
generation of parents migrates to raise income or living standards, while the older generation 
assumes responsibility for raising their grandchildren. Such an arrangement benefits all 
household members, as the middle generation gains a source of inexpensive and reliable 
childcare and the senior generation benefits from the companionship of their grandchildren 
and from migrant remittances (Schoder-Butterfill 2004). 
    Indeed, in the migration literature, rural-to-urban migration is itself seen as part of a 
household strategy, which is prominent in settings where capital, securities, and insurance 
markets are absent or underdeveloped (Stark and Bloom 1985, Lucas and Stark 1985, Stark 
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and Lucas 1988, Stark 1991). Stark (1991) hypothesizes that migrants play the role of 
financial intermediaries, enabling rural households to overcome credit and risk constraints on 
their ability to achieve the transition from familial to commercial production. One or more 
migrants are sent out to make money. Migrants remain a part of their origin household 
throughout the migration experience, and they send remittances back to these households. 
    The notion that the skipped generation residence pattern is part of a household strategy is 
an interesting adjunct to conventional household economic migration models. It implies that 
the family, and its residential unit the household, are important social institutions that 
cushion the effects of economic transition. Not only is the family resilient in the face of 
massive societal restructuring, but the family may itself contribute to structural changes. By 
providing childcare, extended family members free the middle generation from 
responsibilities that may hinder their productive capacity.  
    A household perspective also adds the insight that household members contribute 
differently to household utility depending on their life course stage. The life course 
perspective is useful in understanding these contributions, because it recognizes that 
historical social and economic changes create different opportunities and constraints for 
individuals at different stages in their lives (Elder and Conger 2000).   
    The influence of social change on migration exemplifies differential opportunities, as it is 
typically young adults who migrate to cities to pursue work opportunities, while it is the 
older generation that remains in rural origin communities. The life course perspective 
describes intersecting life course transitions among closely connected individuals (Elder 
1994, Marshall and Mueller 2003, Moen 2003), especially friends, family members, and 
neighbors. As individuals’ lives progress through the life course, individuals balance each 
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others relative abilities and constraints, a process which, in some settings, is affected by 
demographic changes such as migration. 
    I illustrate this intergenerational balance by discussing a hypothetical distribution of 
abilities/constraints as a function of age for three generations of family members: children 
(G1), parents (G2), and grandparents (G3). Each group spans both a time range, as well as a 
distribution of abilities and constraints. The exact age range of each generation varies across 
different contexts, and age limits may be related to such life course transitions as the 
completion of compulsory education or possibly retirement. This range of abilities and 
constraints can be thought of as a combination of social, economic, and physiological 
characteristics. By examining the nature of the abilities and constraints for each group, age-
dependent complementarities begin to become apparent. 
    The middle generation (G2) is at a stage in their life course where it has completed 
compulsory education and is far from retirement. Typically members of this generation are 
able to take on the burden of manual labor, and they are just beginning to get established in 
their jobs. Parents in this generation face the so-called “mid-life squeeze” (Jiang 1995) or 
“life-cycle squeeze” (Hareven 2000): they must foot the costs of their children’s (G1) 
education, clothing, and general sustenance, while simultaneously providing for the 
wellbeing of their aging parents (G3). Quite frequently they do not own their own dwelling 
unit, they may have little land. They may not own the agricultural equipment needed to farm 
what land they have.  
    Yet these parents also have a unique ability, they are best able to migrate and earn income 
to meet the growing needs of family members that stem from the transition to a cash 
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economy2. This is important, because wage labor positions are often located at a considerable 
distance from rural areas in many developing countries.   
    The younger and older generations are also characterized by unique abilities and 
constraints. Children (G1) have the narrowest range of abilities and the most constraints.  
Children are the most limited in terms of their physical development, which makes them 
dependent upon parents and kin for their very survival. However, the exact degree of 
dependence is itself contingent on the age and physical development of the child, and 
decreases with age and development. 
    Grandparents (G3) are at the far end of their life course in terms of their chronological age, 
yet the distribution of their abilities and constraints is fairly wide. Often this generation is 
free from familial responsibilities such as having to care for their own children. This is 
especially true in low fertility populations. They may be asked to provide care for their 
grandchildren, especially if older siblings of the G2 are not available.   
    Members of this generation may have the advantage of owning resources such as a 
housing unit, land, farm machinery, and other equipment that they have accumulated 
throughout their lives. Because farm labor is very physically demanding, this generation’s 
lifetime of work may have taken a heavy physical toll on its members. This physical cost 
may restrict their potential to continue working or to migrate away in search of new work 
opportunities. As such, they are dependent on the middle generation for money and care. In 
turn, the middle generation may be dependent on the elder generation for access to housing, 
land, and agricultural equipment. They may also be dependent on the senior generation for 
                                                 
2 It may be objected that young, single individuals, not parents, are more likely to migrate to earn money.  This 
is no doubt correct, but, as will become apparent later in the paper, child birth may occur after migration and 
children can be sent back to migration-sending areas to live in skipped generation households.  Parents can 
remain in migration destinations even after the birth of their children. 
 18
providing inexpensive and reliable childcare during the parents’ absence in the course of a 
migration episode. 
Setting 
    Because interconnections among a changing economy, migration, intergeneration linkages, 
and needs associated with care for children are affected by regional context, I describe Nang 
Rong, the setting for this paper. Nang Rong is an agrarian district located in Buriram 
province, Northeast Thailand near the Cambodian border (see map in Figure 2.1). The district 
was a frontier region during the first six decades of the 20th century (Entwisle et al. 1998, 
Rindfuss et al. 2005). Following the closing of the frontier, road construction, electrification, 
telecommunications improvements, and migration substantially changed the way that people 
lived (Curran 1995). Nang Rong has been the site of on-going longitudinal research since 
1984, and the district has experienced a number of changes in that time period. I use 
measures computed from the Nang Rong data to illustrate economic and demographic 
changes in the district. 
    Panel data were collected over the course of three waves3. Baseline data were collected in 
1984 when a full household census was conducted for 51 sample villages, with information 
gathered for all household members. Subsequent waves of data collection occurred in 1994 
and 2000, when a complete census was again conducted in each of the 51 villages. Each 
wave of data collection includes social and demographic information regarding household 
composition, migration, land use, and other subjects. In addition, a migrant follow-up was 
conducted in 22 sample villages in 1994 and 2000. 
 
                                                 
3 For more details on the Nang Rong data see http://www.cpc.unc.edu/projects/nangrong/data; also see Entwisle 
et al. 1996, Godley 2001, Vanwey 2003. 
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Economic Development and the Shift to a Money Economy 
    Figure 2.2 illustrates changes in economic development. The figure includes measures of 
the percentage of households owning certain assets and having particular amenities across the 
three data waves. The data show evidence of rapid economic development and a shift to a 
monetized economy. There is a marked increase in the use of utilities over time. While only a 
fraction of households had water piped into their households in 1984, almost 40 percent of 
them had it by 2000. Electricity, while only available to about a third of households in 1984, 
was nearly universal in 2000.  
    The period between 1984 and 1994 shows a rise in the ownership of consumer products, 
particularly the television. In these ten years, television ownership increased from under eight 
percent to nearly 70 percent of households. This was followed by an increase of 
approximately 25 percent in households owning refrigerators between 1994 and 2000.  
    Ownership of working assets also increased. Itans (multi-purpose agricultural vehicles) 
and especially motorcycles witnessed a steady increase throughout the 16 year period. 
Motorcycles are a typical form of transportation in many developing countries, and can be 
used for any number of purposes, such as getting to and from work and bringing agricultural 
products to market. Automobile (cars, trucks, and pick-ups) ownership remains uncommon in 
the district. 
Demographic Change in Nang Rong 
    Nang Rong also experienced rapid demographic change during the period under study. 
The population living in study villages dropped from 32,342 to 31,128 between 1984 and 
1994, and then increased to 34,298 in 2000. While some of this drop is associated with 
natural decrease, much of is attributable to migration. Migration has been common in the 
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Northeast region where migration rates are higher than other major regions (North, Central, 
and South) (Chamratrithirong et al. 1995, Goldstein 1987, Pejaranonda et al. 1995). My 
qualitative interviews with villagers suggest that poverty, job scarcity, debt, and the shift to a 
money economy motivate young people to leave rural villages in search of better-paying jobs 
on urban construction sites and in factories. 
    Migrants from the study area and other parts of the Northeast migrate to both rural and 
urban destinations (Chamratrithirong et al. 1995, VanWey 2004). Migration to rural areas is 
thought to be associated with marriage while urban migration is for labor. Major destinations 
for urban migrants include Bangkok, the Eastern Seaboard, and regional cities like Korat4. 
Much of migration in Nang Rong is seasonal or circular migration, and is linked to labor 
demand fluctuations related to the agricultural cycle (Chamratrithirong et al. 1995, Richter et 
al 1997).  
Migration and Childcare 
    Migration is selective of young age adults (which was roughly 16-37 in 1994) 5, as shown 
in Figure 2.3. On a trip to Nang Rong during the dry season, an idle season from an 
agricultural perspective, fieldwork by Rindfuss (1991) noted that young adults were 
conspicuously absent. In rural villages only middle-aged and elderly adults could be seen, as 
well as the small children of the absent young adults. Most of the villagers that I spoke to 
during fieldwork in 2005 said that it was common for migrating parents to leave their 
children in the care of relatives, especially the maternal grandmother.  
                                                 
4 Korat (formally known as Nakhon Ratchasima) is a nearby provincial city, the largest city in the Northeast.  
The Eastern Seaboard Development Project was a major public-private joint venture carried out in three 
provinces in Thailand (Chonburi, Rayong, and Chacheongsao) during the late 1980s.  The project sought to 
stimulate regional economic development, and to decentralize economic activity away from Bangkok.  The plan 
called for investment in heavy and light industry development, tourism, and deep sea ports which were 
developed for the exploration of natural gas in the Gulf of Thailand (Shatkin 2004). 
 
5 The age distribution of migrants relative to the Nang Rong village population is similar in 2000. 
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    The absence of young people has also been noted in other parts of Northeast Thailand as 
well (Phongphit and Hewison 2001). The 1990 Thai Census shows that compared with other 
migration flows throughout Thailand, a far smaller portion of rural-to-urban migrants are 
children (Pejaranonda et al. 1995). This may suggest that parents who migrate from rural 
villages to cities do so alone, while their children remain in rural villages. 
    To better understand Thai childcare arrangements it is important to have some background 
on Thai social norms about who is best suited to care for young children. Richter et al.’s 
(1992) in-depth interviews reveal that mothers are the first choice for care of infants, and the 
maternal grandmother is the clear second choice. The maternal grandmother was thought to 
be an even better choice for childcare than the mother if the mother could bring in a good 
income (ibid).   
    Several reasons were suggested.  First, many newlyweds follow the culturally proscribed 
matrilocal postnuptial residence pattern (Limanonda 1995, Limanonda and Kowantanakul 
2002, Knodel et al. 1995, Tan 2002). Given the “loosely structured” nature of Thai society, 
newly married couples may live anywhere, but they are expected to, and commonly do, live 
with the bride’s parents. This is a temporary arrangement that lasts until either the couple’s 
first child is born, or the next parent’s daughter marries and her husband moves into the 
household (Limanonda 1995, Limanonda and Kowantanakul 2002, Knodel et al. 1995, Tan 
2002). Traditional expectations that couples move in with the bride’s family make it 
“normal” for children to live with maternal relatives. Second, childcare is considered the 
responsibility of women, not men, so grandmothers are a natural choice for childcare 
providers. 
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    Nang Rong parents face a variety of childcare options if they choose to migrate. However, 
evidence from the survey of Childcare, Women’s Status, and Fertility, conducted by the 
Institute of Population and Social Research (IPSR) at Mahidol University suggests that 
formal childcare institutions in cities and non-relative care are not popular choices (Richter et 
al. 1992; Richter 1997). The study collected qualitative data from a sample of Bangkok 
mothers. It found a high degree of conflict and distrust of non-relative childcare. Women of 
all socioeconomic levels expressed a similar distrust for bringing younger children into 
formal care in day care centers and nurseries. Perhaps because formal care was new during 
the study period, only a few respondents had actually used such facilities, and some 
described neglect and poor quality care in these settings (Richter et al. 1992; Richter 1997).  
    Richter (1992) found that about 16% of urban Bangkok women (including migrants and 
non-migrants) choose to live separately from their children, even if the child was born in 
Bangkok. Mothers are usually forced into such an arrangement by their economic situation, 
but it may also reflect the availability of relatives to provide care and a preference for care by 
relatives rather than non-relatives (Richter et al. 1992, Richter 1997). Richter’s (1996) 
multivariate analysis indicates that mothers who migrate to Bangkok as young, single 
women, who have secondary or higher education, and who work as private employees in a 
formal workplace are most likely to live separately from children. 
Data 
    In this research, I use both qualitative and quantitative data. Data for the qualitative portion 
come from semi-structured interviews conducted in Nang Rong during February 2005. These 
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data were collected in seven villages throughout Nang Rong district. Villages were selected 
on a non-probability basis, and were intended to capture variability in village contexts6.  
    Qualitative Interviews targeted individuals who had experienced childcare arrangements 
that involved parents living away from children. Villagers who were otherwise 
knowledgeable about such arrangements were also interviewed. A total of 41 interviews were 
conducted with village headmen, public health workers, relatives caring for children of 
absent migrants, former migrants whose children were cared for by relatives, and parents 
whose spouse is a migrant. Interviews tended to last between 45 minutes to an hour. The 
interviews were recorded, transcribed, and translated into English. 
    Respondents were sampled using a combination of non-probability techniques 
(convenience sampling and snowball sampling). The qualitative data are not intended to be 
representative of the population in Nang Rong, rather they were selected to provide insights 
into the interpretation of the quantitative results. The quantitative data come from the 2000 
wave of the Nang Rong projects social survey.  
Basic Approach 
    To grasp the interconnections among migration, intergeneration linkages, and needs 
associated with care for children I use insights from the semi-structured interviews and 
estimates from a series of statistical regression models. Of main interest is how the presence 
of non-parental caregivers and life course position are related to the migration status of 
parents relative to their children. Although the quantitative data do not measure childcare 
directly, my qualitative interviews were aimed in part at understanding the nature of care 
                                                 
6 For example, villages were chosen on the basis of distance to the district town, remoteness, age of the village, 
the presence of international migrants, distance to irrigation canals, the cultivation of cassava (an upland cash 
crop), and so on.  The pattern of living separately from children seemed largely identical across villages. 
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provided by grandparents and other relatives. These interviews provide broad evidence that 
grandparents become primary care providers for children of absent parents.  
    The location of parents has implications for the care of the child. Married couples can 
adopt migration strategies that involve the migration of one or both parents. Therefore, 
children may live with both parents, only one parent, or neither parent. If only one parent 
migrates, the child could be cared for by the remaining parent. If both parents migrate and do 
not bring the child, someone else, most often a relative, must take over the child’s 
supervision.  
    I use a cross-sectional design to look at the location of parents of Nang Rong children. To 
capture parental migration status, I include the migration of the child’s mother and father as 
part of the dependent variable. I define migrants as anyone living outside of the village. In 
order to understand the determinants of these different parent-child arrangements, I relate 
them to a set of independent variables measuring household demographics, demographic 
characteristics of mothers and children, measures of the household economy, and village 
characteristics. 
Sample 
    The absence of a proper sampling frame is a reality in many migration studies because of 
the inherent mobility of this population. In order to capture the experiences of my population 
of interest, I focus on child-parent dyads for all children living in the village. I construct an 
analysis sample by starting with a universe of all children, age 13 or younger, living in the 
village in 2000. I use 13 as an age cut-off for children because compulsory education usually 
ends around this age and people begin to migrate on their own.  
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    In studying the childcare arrangements for children of migrant parents, my aim is to 
examine both the characteristics of children and their parents. This necessitates linking data 
on parents and children. I link children and parents using data attributed to children regarding 
the location and identification number of their parents, and from information attributed to 
parents themselves regarding their location and identification number. However, parent and 
child records can only be matched if both parents and children are listed on the household 
roster. This is assured in the case of children, because my sample is limited to only children 
residing in the village, but this is only true for a subset of parents, because of the way that the 
data were collected. A detailed explanation of the data collection procedure will make the 
reasons for this clear. 
    Using a key informant from each household, data were collected on all household 
members living in the household, as well as proxy reports for anyone living outside of the 
household. For those living outside of the household, a proxy report is only available for 
anyone listed in a previous wave of data (i.e. either 1984 or 1994). Note that individuals 
residing outside of the household, such as migrants, would be excluded in a typical cross-
sectional design. However, because they are embedded in a longitudinal study that collects 
info on out-migrants, I have data on these non-resident household members and I include 
them in my sample. Therefore my design goes beyond a conventional cross-section.  
    While this design has the advantage of including additional information on some absent 
household members, data is not available for everyone. Furthermore, coverage can be 
selective. For instance, in comparing a sample of 5,112 currently married Nang Rong 
couples, I found that 22 percent of husbands were not listed on the household roster, while 
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only 4 percent of women were not listed on the household roster. The majority (64 percent) 
of these missing men were migrants, whose wives were living with their natal family. 
    This pattern is not surprising given matrilocal postnuptial residence customs in Thailand. 
Suppose a man followed Thai tradition and moved in with his wife’s family, and he 
subsequently migrated outside of the village. If timing of his residential changes occurred 
between survey waves, he would have never been included on the household roster. Hence 
information about him would never have been collected, although his wife’s information may 
still be on the household roster from an earlier wave.  
    Because of the nearly complete coverage of women, I use the mother-child pair as the unit 
of analysis and I exclude the characteristics of fathers. This is reasonable, because the mother 
is usually the preferred caretaker of children in Thailand (Richter et al. 1992). This ensures 
that the characteristics of at least one of the parents can be included in analysis. Demographic 
characteristics of the mother are potentially important determinants of arrangements in which 
mothers live separately from their children. In cases in which the mother is not listed on the 
household roster, her characteristics cannot be used. This presents a problem: either a 
complete set of variables can be used for a potentially selective sub-sample of mothers and 
children, or a less complete set of variables can be used for a more extensive subset of 
mothers and children. To deal with this issue, I create several different sub-samples of 
children, which are shown in Table 2.1, and I conduct sensitivity analyses to determine how 
the inclusion of subsets of children affects results. 
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    Table 2.1 presents the location status of parents for children residing in Nang Rong 
villages in 20007. Fortunately, information on the parents’ location was collected even if the 
parent was not listed on the roster, which allows for complete coverage of the relative 
location of children and both parents. The sample of most interest includes children whose 
mothers are listed on the household roster, because they have the most complete set of 
variables available.   
    I divide these mother-child pairs into mothers who are currently married and those who are 
not currently married. The latter contains single mothers, divorcees, widows, and women 
who are separated. I make this distinction because parental migration associated with marital 
instability is related to a different set of processes compared to the more common practice of 
migrating for labor. I focus on labor migration. 
    I also make separate subsets for children whose mothers were not on the household roster 
and for children for whom both the mother and father were not on the household roster. 
These sub-samples contain cases of mothers who are not currently married, but I do not 
attempt to distinguish them from currently married mothers because data on marital status is 
lacking. 
    Table 2.1 shows that the most common overall arrangement was for both parents to live in 
the same village as the child. This is the case in nearly two-thirds of the sample (67.71 
percent). For currently married mothers listed on the household roster, the incidence of this 
arrangement was somewhat higher, accounting for almost four-fifths of the sample (79.99 
percent). Not surprisingly, this arrangement was considerably less frequent for children 
                                                 
7 8 cases were deleted in which the age of the mother exceeded the age of the child by 50 or more years. These 
are likely to be fictive mothers, whose relationship to their children is probably due to errors in the data or to 
calling someone other than the biological mother by the honorific term “mother.” 
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whose mother was not on the household roster (4.27 percent) and for children whose parents 
are both absent from the roster (5.70 percent). 
    The next most common overall arrangement is for the child’s father to be a migrant, while 
the mother remains in the village (12.61 percent). This arrangement is proportionally nearly 
as common for currently married mothers listed on the household roster (12.22 percent) 
compared to the overall sample. It is especially common for children whose mothers are not 
currently married (29.91 percent), which is likely related to divorce. Cases in which mothers 
migrate without their husbands are rare (2.01 percent), but there is variation across sub-
samples. Because of its rare incidence, I do not include this category in my final regression 
analysis, nor do I include orphaned children and children of widows and widowers. 
    Overall, both parents are migrants in 11.59 percent of cases, and there are dramatic 
differences across the sub-samples. The lowest incidence of this arrangement is found among 
currently married mothers who are listed on the roster (6.84 percent), while the highest 
incident is an order of magnitude higher for cases in which neither parent is listed on the 
roster (61.84 percent). 
    One problem with my design is that it does not include children who are migrants. For 
reasons similar to those related to the selective coverage of fathers, there is selective 
coverage of children living outside of the household. I attempt to determine the extent to 
which children migrate by taking a sample of all children age 0-7 living in Nang Rong 
villages in 1994 (who are age 6-13 in 2000) and advancing their data to the 2000 survey, 
thereby determining their location in 2000. Although this approach does not account for 
children younger than age 6, it will determine what percentage of children age 6-13 migrated 
by 2000. 
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    Table 2.2 shows that approximately 12 percent of these children were migrants by 2000: 
4.98 percent were members of households in which all members moved out of the village 
(“moved households”) and 6.65 percent were migrants from households in which at least one 
member remained in the household in the village. While detailed data on the location of the 
parents of children from moved households is not available, this information does exist for 
children who are migrants from households located within the village. This data is presented 
in Table 2.3. Not surprisingly, the table shows that for most migrant children, both of their 
parents are migrants. It is likely that these children live with their parents in destination.  
Method 
    Since the dependent variable is a three-category nominal variable (both parents live in the 
village, father is a migrant while mother lives in the village, and both parents are migrants), I 
use a multinomial logit model. For a model with categories m = 1,…, M – 1, we have: 
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Where β′ is a vector of regression coefficients including the intercept, and Xi is a matrix of 
independent variables for each individual i. Using a logit link function to match the 
probability of being in each category m to the linear predictor, the dependent variable 
becomes the natural log-odds of a respondent being in any category of migration m. In order 
to get unique solutions for each set of regression coefficients, one of the response categories 
is set as a reference category (see Long, 1997: 152 - 153 for details). For ease of 
interpretation, final regression results are presented both in the untransformed logit scale and 
as odds ratios. I show all three contrasts for the models. 
    Since the unit of analysis is the mother-child dyad, and mothers can have multiple 
children, multiple mothers can live in each household, and multiple households can be 
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located in each village, the data are clustered and are not independent of each other. It is 
important to account for clustering, because it artificially lowers standard errors associated 
with coefficients, thereby overestimating t-statistics and overstating the significance of 
estimates. I use heteroskedastically robust standard errors (see White, 1980 for details) to 
correct for the clustering of child records within parents’ records. 
Operationalization of Key Independent Variables 
    I now describe the operationalization of variables used to evaluate arguments put forth 
earlier about the determinants of parental migration. An important determinant of a migration 
pattern in which parents live separately from their children may be the intergenerational 
division of labor whereby grandparents provide childcare for the children of absent migrants, 
who in turn, provide financial support. It might be more difficult for a single grandparent to 
take care of children than it is for both grandparents to do so together. To test this possibility 
I include indicator variables measuring whether only the child’s grandmother, only the 
grandfather, or both grandparents live in the household8.  
    Grandparents may be either maternal or paternal, and Thais clearly distinguish between the 
two. For instance, Thais use different words in referring to maternal and paternal 
grandmothers, the former as referred to as Yai and the latter as Yha. My interviews with 
villagers suggest that it is the duty of maternal relatives to assume childcare responsibilities. 
Yet, paternal relatives are sometimes used as an alternative. When asked about the children 
of migrant parents, an interview with a maternal grandmother illustrated this: 
Interviewer:  If they have to leave their child in this village, who does the child live with? 
 
Grandmother:  A grandmother 
 
                                                 
8 I use information on the relation to household head to determine this data for children whose parents are both 
not listed on the household roster. 
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Interviewer:  Can it be a paternal grandmother? 
 
Grandmother:  Yes, it can 
 
Interviewer:  Between the maternal grandmother and the paternal grandmother, who do  
most people use to take care of children? 
 
Grandmother:  Maternal grandmother 
 
Interviewer:  Why? 
 
Grandmother: Most women will take a child to stay with her mother. 
 
    Because a maternal and paternal grandparent may be equally capable of caring for their 
grandchildren, paternal relatives (in-laws of the mother) will also be counted as 
grandparents9.  
    Table 2.4 shows that approximately a fifth (18 percent) of children whose mothers were 
listed on the household roster and who were currently married had both grandparents living 
in the household. This is considerably lower compared to every other sub-sample. For 
children whose mothers were not currently married, over one-third (36 percent) of them had 
both grandparents living in the household. Approximately half of children whose mother was 
not on the roster (53 percent) had both parents living in the household. Nearly as many (50 
percent) had such an arrangement when neither parent was listed on the roster.  
    Having only the grandmother living in the origin household is the next most common 
arrangement, and this too is the least common for children whose mothers are currently 
married and listed on the roster (10 percent). For the other samples the incidence of this 
arrangement ranges from 17 to 23 percent. Having only a grandfather in the household is rare 
for all sub-samples. 
                                                 
9 I estimated a statistical model to determine if paternal grandparents behave differently than maternal 
grandparents.  Overall, there are few consistent differences between paternal and maternal grandparents.   
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    It is not unexpected that sub-samples of children in which the mother or both parents are 
not listed on the household roster had a higher percentage of grandparents living in the 
household. Table 2.1 clearly showed that a much higher percentage of parents were both 
migrants for these cases. It is reasonable to expect that parents who both migrate are leaving 
their children in the care of grandparents. 
    Research in China has found that grandparents living outside of the natal household are a 
valuable source of childcare for parents (Chen et al. 2000). To determine whether 
grandparents living outside of the household are available to provide childcare, I include 
more detailed data on the location of grandparents. I show the location of the grandmother 
and the grandfather separately. For simplicity I restrict this data to maternal grandparents. 
This data is only available in the event that the mother is listed on the household roster.  
    Results show that the maternal grandfather lives in another household in the village in 26 
percent of cases while the maternal grandmother lives in another household in the village in 
34 percent of cases. It is possible that these grandparents can also be an important source of 
childcare for migrating parents. In the event that a grandparent lives in another village, is 
dead, or is living in an unknown location (perhaps indicating estrangement from the family) 
help with childcare is likely to be less forthcoming. I will formally test this idea in my 
statistical models. 
    Another key determinant of parents’ migration status could be the life course stage of 
various generations of household members. I test this notion by looking at the effect of age of 
the various generations. Nang Rong data is quite unique in that it is possible to link the 
records of multiple generations of household members. In my statistical models, I include 
measures of the age of children (G1) and parents (G2). The age of the mother is only 
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available in the event that the mother was listed on the household roster. For mothers who 
were currently married, their average age was about 33 years. The average age of children 
just under seven years is each sub-sample.  
    I also tried to include the age of the grandparents. However, not all households had a 
grandparent present, so grandparent’s age was not always available. Preliminary results 
showed that grandparent’s age had few consistent statistically significant effects, thus 
grandparent’s age is not included in the final models10.  
Control Variables 
    The rest of the covariates in the statistical models are controls, and I briefly describe key 
variables. I include demographic characteristics of the mother (such as education, and the 
number of children) characteristics of the child (such as gender) and characteristics of the 
origin household (the amount of land owned by the household11, whether or not the 
household grew rice, whether or not the household owned agricultural equipment, and 
household wealth). I also include demographic characteristics of the household (counts of the 
number of people of working age, non-working age, and number of migrants) and a single 
village characteristic (distance from Nang Rong town). 
    Controlling for the mother’s number of children serves to isolate the effect of the child’s 
age. I include a count of the total number of living children excluding the focal child. For 
each record, this is a count of the number of siblings of each child. I expect that parents with 
more children will have greater childcare needs and will find it harder to be migrants living 
                                                 
10 Using various age cutoffs (including 60 and over, 65 and over, and 70 and over) I included dummy variables 
for the age of the grandparent living in the household.   
 
11 It is possible that the effect of land is endogenous with the dependent variable. I conducted a sensitivity 
analysis to investigate whether excluding the land effect would substantially change results. Estimates were 
robust across model specifications. 
 34
apart from their children. However, they may also be under greater pressure to migrate in 
order to earn money to pay for their children’s expenses. 
    Control variables at the household level serve to isolate the effects of variables of most 
interest, especially the age variables, which I assume are markers of generational 
complementarities in abilities and constraints across individual life courses. I control for 
indications of the household’s participation in rice farming (the predominant staple crop), 
including whether or not the household grew rice in the growing season preceding the 
household survey, and whether the household owned agricultural equipment.  
    Table 2.4 shows most households for which the mother is currently married and listed on 
the household roster grew rice (81 percent), although the percentage is smaller for the other 
sub-samples. Ownership of agricultural equipment indicates the procession of productive 
assets and is measured as a dummy variable indicating whether a household owned any 
agricultural equipment such as tractors, rototillers, rice threshers, water pumps, and 
generators.  
    In general, most households do not own agricultural equipment although there are 
differences across sub-samples. Households in which the mother is currently married and is 
listed on the roster are the most likely to own equipment (39 percent) while those households 
in which neither parent is listed on the roster are the least likely to own equipment (27 
percent). 
    To account for differences in socioeconomic status, I include dummy variables measuring 
relative household wealth. It is likely that respondents from both lower and upper 
socioeconomic groups may be more likely to migrate, given that migration is a way of 
loosening the household’s financial constraints or a way to diversify household income.   
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    Following work by Filmer and Pritchett (2001), I use principal components analysis to 
make a wealth index for each household (see Appendix 1 for details). The index uses the 
following household assets: black and white televisions, color televisions, VCRs, 
refrigerators, Itans (agricultural trucks), cars/trucks/pickups, motorcycles, and sewing 
machines. In addition, I include dummy variables for whether a household: cooks with 
electricity or gas, and has windows with wood panes and shutters, glass panes, or bug 
screens. Each household is then grouped into one of three categories, based on its overall 
household wealth index score. Since wealth often tends to be clustered at the top of a wealth 
distribution, I include fewer households in the top of the distribution than at the bottom. 
Households in the lowest third will be considered to be at the “bottom,” those in the 34th to 
79th percentiles will be considered “middle,” and the highest fifth will be considered to be at 
the “top”.    
    The percentage of households in each wealth category does not correspond exactly to the 
fixed percentile breakdown because the wealth index was created using all of the households 
in the sample villages, while my sampling strategy only selected certain households that were 
at risk of experiencing the event under investigation. Nonetheless, across most sub-samples 
the actual breakdown is pretty close to what is expected. 
    The final set of household control variables are related to the demographic composition of 
the household. I measure the number of working and non-working age people living in the 
household, as well as the number of migrants from the household.  Working age people are 
defined as anyone age 13 to 60. In measuring these variables, I avoid double-counting 
individuals already accounted for in the model by excluding children, spouse, and 
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grandparents. This makes some of these counts look somewhat small in the descriptive 
statistics.  
    Counts appear larger for sub-samples for which the mother is not listed on the household 
roster compared to the sub-sample for which the mother is currently married and listed on the 
roster. This is most likely because children and spouses could not be identified for absent 
mothers, thus they were not subtracted out. 
    These counts include siblings and in-law siblings of the middle generation (G2), siblings’ 
family members, and any of the parent’s children who are older than 13. I expect that all else 
being the same, more working age people will mean a higher supply of childcare. However, 
more non-working age people will also mean a greater demand for both childcare and 
possibly elderly care. This will affect the migration of mothers. 
    The number of migrants is operationalized in the same manner as described previously. I 
count the number of migrants from a household, excluding one migrant in the event that a 
focal individual is a migrant. The literature on migrant networks suggests that migrants lower 
the risk of migration for fellow migrants, by improving each other’s access to such things as 
employment and housing (Massey and Basem 1992, Massey et al. 1993, Roberts and Morris 
2004). Maybe migration streams extend to similar migration destinations creating more 
contact with fellow household migrants, who in turn make it easier for their fellow migrants 
to move. I expect that parents will have an easier time migrating if they have migrant 
household members.  
    At the village level I also control for the distance from the village to Nang Rong town. 
During my fieldwork I visited a village located close to Nang Rong town. Interviews with 
villagers suggested that migration was less common in villages located nearest the town, 
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because local employment opportunities were enough to keep residents from migrating away. 
During data collection village coordinates were measured using a Global Positioning System 
(GPS) device. Using the GPS coordinates it is possible to calculate the Euclidean distance 
between the center of the village and the center of Nang Rong town. I expect parents to be 
more likely to leave children behind as the distance between their village and Nang Rong 
town increases. 
Results 
    I now describe the quantitative and qualitative results. I intersperse qualitative accounts 
with the quantitative results to aid in their interpretation. Quantitative results can be found in 
Tables 2.5 and 2.6, which show regression results for the sub-sample of mothers who are 
currently married and are listed on the household roster. Table 2.6 adds more detailed 
information on the location of maternal grandparents living outside of the household to 
determine their effect on parents’ migration. Sensitivity analyses for sub-samples in which 
mothers or both parents are excluded are presented in Tables 2.7-2.9. Model estimates show 
results that are largely robust to differences across samples. 
    Quantitative results show that having both grandparents living in the household (compared 
to situations in which neither grandparent lives in the household) makes it more likely for 
parents to be migrants living apart from their children. Also, in choosing between strategies 
involving both parents migrating or having only the father migrate, married couples choose 
the former if both grandparents are available. 
    The presence of just the grandmother especially encourages the migration of both parents. 
This agrees with qualitative accounts which identify the grandmother as the primary 
childcare provider in the absence of the parents. Results show that having only the 
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grandfather in the household encourages both parents to be migrants. However, given how 
infrequently grandfathers live in a household without the grandmother, this effect should be 
interpreted with caution. 
    Qualitative interviews provide some support for the idea that a division of labor develops 
within households whereby parents provide money for the household and the grandparents 
takes over childcare responsibilities for absent migrants. Villagers report that many 
grandparents provide childcare in exchange for remittance money from migrant parents. An 
assistant headman’s interview exemplifies this: 
Interviewer:  From the grandparents’ perspective, do you think that it is rewarding or 
exciting for them to have to look after their grandchildren? 
 
Headman: It’s to be paid for 
 
Interviewer: Do you mean that parents are like an employer and grandparents are like 
employees? 
 
Headman: Yes, they give money to the grandparent who looks after their children and 
someone is hired to look after their children 
 
    I examine remittance in more detail using available data from a subset of mothers who 
were migrants and whose record was included on a previous data panel. Descriptive statistics 
in Figure 2.4 show migrant-to-household remittance (percentage by type). A majority of 
mothers sent some form of remittance. In general, money, food, and clothing are the most 
likely to be sent. Money was especially common. The percentage of mothers sending money 
was just over 80 percent of mothers. Mothers were less likely to send clothes and food, with 
over forty percent sending each kind of remittance. Qualitative interviews suggested that 
remittance money from parents was used to offset the costs of basic living and educational 
expenses.   
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    Grandmothers take on all childcare responsibilities; they cook for grandchildren, wash 
their clothes, play with them, take them to school in the morning, and sometimes bathe them 
(depending on the age of the child). Grandfathers and aunts sometimes also help the 
grandmother by taking children to the public health center to get vaccinations. Children 
usually live with the grandparents until they themselves are old enough to migrate. They 
rarely see their parents. Parents only return a few times per year on long weekends or 
holidays like Songkran day, New Year’s day (and Chinese New Year), or Election day. 
Children seldom visit their parents in migration destinations, and if they do, it is usually 
during the summer when school is not in session.   
    Villagers I interviewed cite a number of reasons why children cannot stay at their parents’ 
destinations. First, parents find living apart from their children more economical. Many 
parents move to cities, which are expensive. Typically both parents work long hours, and 
even if they share a room with other people, no one has time to care for children. The cost of 
hiring a baby sitter is usually prohibitive. It is more affordable to leave children in rural 
areas, where school fees and kin-based childcare are less expensive. Villagers also expressed 
a distrust of non-relative daycare. Interviews also suggested that it is difficult to get 
grandparents to live in the city. An interview with a maternal grandmother demonstrates this: 
Interviewer: Why did her parents leave this child with you? 
 
Grandma: They are too busy with their work 
 
Interviewer: Do they think about taking their child to live with them? 
 
Grandma: They’re thinking about that. 
 
… 
 
Interviewer: Don’t you like Bangkok? 
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Grandma: I hate Bangkok. It’s very hot and crowded with people. 
 
Interviewer: Is it a rental room [in which you stayed when you lived in Bangkok]? 
 
Grandma: It was a small one. 
 
Interviewer: How much is room rental per month? 
 
Grandma: It’s around Baht 2,000 [about $50] per month including electricity and water 
charges 
 
Interviewer: Were there 4 people in 1 small room? 
 
Grandma: It’s too small and uncomfortable. It’s more space here that she can play 
around. And she can study here. 
 
    In Table 2.6, I evaluate whether maternal grandparents who live in the origin household 
(from which the parents migrated) have a different effect on the migration of parents 
compared to grandparents living in other locations, particularly other households in the 
village. Results show that it is most likely for both parents to be migrants when the 
grandfather or the grandmother lives in the origin household. Having maternal grandparents 
live in any other location (another household in the village, somewhere outside the village, or 
in some unknown location) makes it less likely that the parents will both be migrants. Results 
are stronger for grandmothers than grandfathers, particularly grandfathers who live outside of 
the village for whom there is no statistically significant effect. The finding that parents’ 
migration is more sensitive to the presence of the maternal grandmothers supports qualitative 
accounts that childcare is the maternal grandmother’s responsibility. 
    Qualitative results suggest that many parents follow a familiar life course pattern and make 
a deliberate choice to use grandparents as childcare providers. Before they become parents, 
young people migrate to find work after completing primary school. While in their twenties, 
they often find a marriage partner at the destination, as suggested by Jampaklay’s (2003) 
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work on marriage and migration in Nang Rong. When women become pregnant, they often 
return to rural origin villages to give birth, in part because it is more expensive to deliver a 
baby in cities like Bangkok. Mothers usually stay with their baby for three months, which is 
the maximum amount of time that Thai labor laws grant for maternity leave. After three 
months the mothers will return to work in the city, perhaps joining their husband in the 
process. 
    Quantitative results show support for the idea that intersecting life course transitions, as 
indicated by the effect of the age of parents and children, are related to migration and 
childcare. The age of the mother had a significant negative effect on the migration of her 
husband. As the mother’s age increases the odds of a husband migrating alone decreases. 
This effect may be related to the age of the husband, which could not be included in the 
model. It may be that migration becomes more difficult at older ages, since job opportunities 
are more likely to be taken by younger people. It may also capture the effect of the 
grandparents’ age, because older grandparents may have more difficulty caring for young 
children. 
    The age of the child is also important in determining the migration status of the parents. 
Results show that as children get older, the odds that both of parents being migrants 
increases. This could mean that older children are more likely to be left behind. The effect of 
the number of children suggests that having additional children makes it more difficult for 
both parents to be migrants. Unfortunately a lack of information on the exact timing of 
parents’ migration and the children’s birth makes it difficult to understand the precise 
connection between the child’s life course characteristics and the parent’s migration. 
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Control Variables 
    Results of control variables point to other consistent findings. Indications of a household’s 
involvement in farming tend to keep parents from being migrants. In general, households that 
grew rice were less likely to have both parents be migrants. In addition, owning agricultural 
equipment makes it less likely that both parents are migrants. These variables especially 
influence the migration of fathers, who are less likely to migrate alone. A possible 
explanation for the effect of farming is that families who can successfully provide for their 
household’s livelihood through farming have less motivation to migrate. The effect of wealth 
is also significant. Parents from households in the highest wealth category were less likely to 
both be migrants relative to parents in middle wealth households. Most likely these parents 
can afford to stay in the village and they too probably have less motivation to migrate. 
    Other consistent findings are related to household demographics. For the most part, results 
show that having more working age people living in the household increases the likelihood 
that both parents will be migrants living away from their children. This suggests that other 
people in the household beside the grandparents may be helping parents with childcare. As 
the following interview with a maternal grandmother makes clear, a maternal aunt is 
sometimes a good substitute, and commonly aunts assist grandmothers in providing care. 
Another option is the paternal grandmother. Grandmothers consider it their duty to care for 
their grandchildren because they share blood ties. 
Interviewer: Why does the parent ask you to look after their child instead of asking anyone 
else? 
 
Grandmother: Because I am staying alone and I don’t have anything to do 
 
Interviewer: How about families that have no maternal grandmother? 
 
Grandmother: So it will be their aunt or someone 
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Interviewer: How do you feel about looking after your children and then you have to do the 
same thing again [with your grandchildren]? 
 
Grandmother: Well, I have had to do it unwillingly 
 
Interviewer: How? 
 
Grandmother: If I looked after their children she [the mother] will give some money to me, if 
I do not do it, she will not give some money to me. 
 
Interviewer: Is it good? 
 
Grandmother: Anyway, I have to do it. 
 
    For the most part, non-working age people have a similar effect on the migration of 
parents. These people are likely to be nephews and nieces of the parents (cousins of the 
children), and parents may take advantage of economies of scale when leaving children in the 
care of relatives. Such an explanation has been suggested by Holmes and Tiefenthaler’s 
(1997) research in Cebu, Philippines. 
    Another finding is that the number of migrants from the household is positively related to 
both parents being migrants. Most likely, social network connections to these migrants lower 
the risk of migration by improving access to such things as employment and housing 
(Massey and Basem 1992, Massey et al. 1993, Roberts and Morris 2004). Also, migration 
streams likely extend to similar migration destinations, facilitating contacts with fellow 
household migrants who make it easier to migrate. 
    At the village level, the effect of distance from Nang Rong town had a significant positive 
effect on the migration of both parents. This effect is consistent with the idea that local 
employment provides sufficient opportunity for parents living in villages closest to Nang 
Rong town to prevent them from migrating. These local employment opportunities lower the 
parents’ motivation to migrate in order to make a living. 
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Other Qualitative Findings 
    Qualitative interviews yielded a few other interesting findings, which reveal some of the 
problems related to parents living separately from children. There were isolated cases of 
outright child abandonment. Some grandmothers complained that such a pattern lowered the 
consequences of childcare for mothers and encouraged teen pregnancy. Also, a public health 
worker expressed concern about the grandparent’s ability to provide adequate childcare: 
Interviewer: Do older grandparents have any problem bringing up children? 
 
Nurse: Yes, they will bring up children in the wrong way. 
 
Interviewer: How is it the wrong way? 
 
Nurse: The basic upbringing up is not good. When children have problems, 
grandparent will come to me. I will suggest how to do correctly. Nowadays, 
the elders think drugs are the best way to solve a problem.  
… 
 
Interviewer: Is it possible that they didn’t bring up children like this in the past? 
 
Nurse: Yes, it’s different from before. It wasn’t progressive like today. In the past, 
they brought up children with mother’s milk and by feeding rice. Now the 
government informs them that children have to get mother’s milk for 4 
months. But children will often go hungry. So the elder will feed rice to them 
since children are 1 – 2 months old. The children will sleep; they will have a 
nutrition problem. 
 
Discussion and Conclusion 
    In this paper I examine factors related to various living arrangements used to accomplish 
work and childcare for migrant parents. The setting is a region experiencing high migration 
and a shift to an industrial economy. Specifically, I investigated an intergenerational 
household division of labor in which the older generation cares for the children of absent 
migrant parents, who provide for economic needs of their origin households. The results 
demonstrate the flexibility with which the family institution adapts to socioeconomic change. 
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At a time of rapid industrialization, having a grandparent living in the origin household is an 
important determinant of a residential arrangement whereby parents live apart from their 
children.  
    Despite the geographic distance between the location of urban jobs and the availability of 
trusted and affordable childcare from extended kin, households continue to find ways to 
provide for the needs of their members. Parents adapt to changing economic circumstances 
by migrating away from rural villages in search of work. At the same time, they retain the 
benefits of the traditional postnuptial residence pattern, which include inexpensive and 
trusted childcare.  
    In the process the natal household gains a source of cash income, which is essential to 
rural villagers experiencing poverty, limited work opportunities, and a transition to a cash 
economy. A division of labor based on complementary abilities and constraints develops that 
seems to be related to earning potential or labor provided by family members at different 
stages of their life course. 
    While the family adapts to socioeconomic change, adaptations tend to reflect cultural and 
traditional contexts in which families are embedded. Although some aspects of the rural Thai 
family seem to be changing to adapt to new circumstances, other aspects of family life 
remain unchanged. Evidence suggests that household labor allocation can involve both an 
intergenerational and a gender division of labor. Currently married women with children 
were found to migrate without their spouse far less frequently than men. This is no doubt 
related to traditional Thai gender roles that encourage women to be responsible for care of 
dependent family members, while encouraging men to be responsible for the financial 
wellbeing of the household. Further evidence of gender roles is provided by the effect of 
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grandmothers, who, to a greater extent than grandfathers, seem to be an important correlate 
to the migration of both parents.  
    As Thailand continues its transition to an urban industrial base, future generations will 
probably begin to use widely available and relatively affordable childcare located closer to 
their place of work. At the time of the study, formal childcare institutions were not a mature 
industry in Thailand, but they will probably come into existence as demand increases. It is 
likely that the role of extended kin will take on a diminished role as new formal childcare 
institutions replace this more traditional form of childcare. Thus, this pattern of parents living 
separately from their children is most likely ephemeral, and it may exemplify a structural lag 
between rapid macro economic transition and sluggish adjustment in the formal childcare 
industry. 
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CHAPTER III 
 
AGRICULTURAL AID AND INTERGENERATIONAL 
RELATIONS IN A CONTEXT OF INDUSTRIAL TRANSITION 
 
 
    Changes in social relationships associated with the transformation from a rural, 
subsistence-based economy to an urban, industrial economy have preoccupied sociologists 
from the very inception of the discipline (see for example Durkheim [1893] 1984, Marx 
[1847] 1978, and Weber, [1904] 1998). This transformation, typified by a decline in family 
farming and an increase in urban migration and non-family work, creates massive 
dislocations that affect the nature of social relationships. In recent discussions on this issue, a 
predominant theme is change within the family, and its residential unit, the household. The 
family is the primary social unit within pre-industrial or agricultural communities (Caldwell 
2004, Coleman 1993). It is the key institution linking macro-level social change and micro-
level individual behavior (Axinn and Yabiku 2001, Goldscheider 1995, Hareven 2000), and 
it acts as an agent of change as well as being subject to the effects of changes (Hareven 2000, 
Thornton 2001). 
    Researchers studying family change resulting from the transition to an industrial base have 
focused on the gradual loss of family functions to non-familial entities (Axinn and Yabiku 
2001, Caldwell 2004, Coleman 1993, Hareven 2000, Morgan 2003). Underlying these losses 
in family function are dramatic changes in the way that family members orient themselves to 
one another. Examples of this abound in the literature. For instance, changes in 
transportation, communication, and monetization reorganize production outside of the 
household, altering the significance of individual labor for the household as a collective 
entity as well as for individual household members (Axinn and Yabiku 2001).  
    Loss of function is not limited to production, but can include consumption, socialization, 
and social control. Changes in formal education, for example, reverse the flow of wealth 
previously running from the younger generation to older generation, to one flowing from the 
older generation to the younger generation. This alters the costs and benefits of child bearing 
(Caldwell 1976). 
    The effects of transformations stemming from urban migration and industrialization are 
especially salient for families living in rural developing regions in which economic activities 
centered on household subsistence are under transition. Employment prospects in cities and 
seemingly shrinking opportunities in rural areas have created a diaspora of young people out 
of these areas. This is a pattern found historically in developed countries in the West (Elder 
and Conger 2000) and is presently occurring or will occur in much of the developing world 
(Caldwell 2004). 
    The movement of young people out of agrarian communities has important implications 
for the way in which a generation of adult children relate to their parents. In such areas, 
contributing to household production (in the form of agricultural labor) is perhaps one of the 
most important obligations to the family economy because such labor enables the household 
to continue its fundamental productive activity. Yet, rapid economic change and migration 
make fulfilling this obligation considerably difficult for migrating young people.    
    While the younger generation migrates, the older generation remains behind in rural areas. 
This creates pressure on the younger generation to fulfill its duties to kin at origin, because 
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they must balance these responsibilities with obligations to non-familial institutions or new 
familial ones at destination. The absence of young people is especially a concern for the older 
generation. This generation has the primary responsibility for the family farm. Members of 
this generation are usually the heads of rural households, and they own the land and 
equipment needed to farm the land. Yet, as this generation ages it becomes increasingly 
difficult for it to keep up with the burden of physically demanding agricultural work. Thus, 
as the young generation leaves, the older generation is faced with the task of replacing lost 
labor.   
    To better understand generational relations in the context of industrialization and mass 
migration, I draw on insights from the life course perspective and from the literature on 
migration and intergenerational support. The life course perspective views families as being 
made up of a matrix of interlinked lives (Elder and Conger 2000). Individual lives are 
connected and integrated within family goals or larger household strategies (Hareven 2000). 
Household strategies involve explicit or implicit choices families make to generate new 
opportunities in the face of changing opportunities and constraints (ibid). 
    Household strategies result from both external social and cultural changes as well as the 
internal composition and life course stages of household members. In the absence of non-
familial institutions (such as welfare agencies, social security, pensions, childcare centers, 
and nursing homes), the family is the primary source of security, and the interdependency of 
household members is high. Household strategies reflect this interdependency.  
    The life course perspective recognizes that individual agency is constantly adapting and 
reshaping life plans to meet new circumstances and the changing social reality (Hareven 
2000). It also recognizes that historical social and economic changes create different 
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opportunities and constraints for individuals at different points in their life course (Elder and 
Conger 2000). The migration experience exemplifies this, as it is typically young adults who 
migrate to cities to pursue work opportunities, while it is the older generation that remains in 
rural origin communities. 
    With the onset of social changes associated with a loss of family function and the rise of 
institutions that compete with family obligations, family members begin to reorient their 
behavior in ways that reflect less dependence on family and more dependence on non-
familial institutions. Such changes are perceptible in the strategies that household members 
begin to follow. Prior to economic transition, household strategies aim to distribute human 
labor in ways that maximize agricultural output (i.e. older women are primarily responsible 
for the care of children, younger men are primarily responsible for physically demanding 
work, and so forth).  
    During the transition young people begin to work as wage laborers in factories or on 
construction sites. Such labor can be related to household strategies aimed at diversifying risk 
or creating investment, but this also exposes young people to sources of labor that compete 
with the rural household as the sole source of labor. This can lead to less dependence on 
family members, as migrants begin to depend more on their employers. In this paper I 
compare models of household strategies to understand which strategies typify relations 
among family members in times of transition to an industrial economy. These models are the 
altruism/corporate group model, the power and bargaining model, and the mutual aid model. 
I discuss each in turn below. 
    I focus on one aspect of this broad process of changing family relations, using a case study 
of agricultural help provided by adult children to their parents. Specifically, I examine 
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household strategies associated with help with the rice harvest provided by a cohort of 
working-age migrants to their origin households in Nang Rong, Thailand. Thailand is a 
developing country which has been experiencing a shift to an urban industrial economy since 
the 1980s. In recent decades Nang Rong has experienced rapid development accompanied by 
high rates of out-migration, especially among young people. This migration of young people 
is likely to reflect household strategies that show decreased dependency between the 
generations of family members.    
    Despite high migration among young people, young people’s labor is valuable for rural 
households. Growing rice is the central subsistence activity in Nang Rong as in other parts of 
Thailand. Rice is the main dietary stable. Rice production has a pronounced seasonality, 
which follows the timing of the monsoon and rice harvesting needs to be completed within a 
short time frame. This involves significant labor inputs, and failure to harvest quickly can 
result in a lower yield. Although many aspects of rice farming have changed over the recent 
decades, rice harvesting has remained relatively unchanged, and Nang Rong villagers still 
rely on traditional methods. 
Migration and Models of Household Strategies 
    Two bodies of literature address intergenerational relations during the industrial urban 
transition: the migration literature and the literature on intergenerational support. Both have 
developed models of household strategies that arise between the younger generation of 
migrants and the older generation of parents residing in origin households.  
    In the intergenerational support literature, various researchers (e.g. Frankenberg, et al. 
2002, Lillard and Willis 1997, Lee et al. 1994, Zimmer and Kwong 2003) have broadly 
defined three models for understanding familial support within households. The first model is 
 70
the power and bargaining model, which emphasizes power relationships that decide different 
levels of losses and gains in the struggle for family resources (Goode 1963). The second is 
the altruism/corporate group model, which emphasizes the allocation of wealth among 
household members that initially maximizes wealth, and subsequently distributes that wealth 
in an efficient manner (Becker 1974). The third model, the mutual aid model, emphasizes 
voluntary quid-pro-quo exchanges among household members (Cox 1987, Morgan and 
Hirosima 1983).  
    In the migration literature, the work of the New Economics of Migration is most 
significant to understanding household migration strategies. As there are many similarities 
between the models developed by the intergenerational support and migration literatures, I 
consider the convergence of these perspectives. New Economics of Migration researchers 
view migration decisions as choices made by households to diversify their income while 
minimizing risks in settings where capital, insurance, and futures markets are absent (Lucas 
and Stark 1985, Stark and Taylor 1989, Stark and Taylor 1991, Stark 1991). The New 
Economics of Migration argues that as part of these decisions, a tacit contract is developed 
that is designed to improve the welfare of both households and migrants.  
    With regard to interdependency among family members, the power and bargaining model 
is the only model which suggests low levels of interdependency. Although the 
altruism/corporate group model and the mutual aid model both predict relatively high 
interdependency among family members, these models are slightly different from one 
another. The altruism/corporate group model is associated with inter-temporal exchanges 
which yield efficiency in the distribution of household resources. The mutual aid model 
describes contemporaneous exchanges of services, which do not necessarily distribute 
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household resources in an efficient manner. What follows is a more detailed explanation of 
each model, and corresponding hypotheses. 
Power and Bargaining Model 
    The power and bargaining model is analogous to a bargaining model developed by the 
New Economics of Migration. It suggests that migrants and households (or younger and 
older generations in the intergeneration support model) agree on the particulars of their 
obligations by means of bargaining. Through bargaining, both parties (migrants and 
households or young and old generations) pursue an arrangement that best suits their 
individual interests, be it motivated by altruistic or instrumental ends. Bargaining power is 
determined by relative attributes of the origin household and the migrant (Lucas and Stark 
1988).  
    Migrants with higher human capital endowments (more education, more stable 
employment) have higher bargaining power compared to migrants with lower human capital 
endowments. In these cases the power and bargaining model predicts less contribution to the 
origin household’s welfare. In contrast, when household members have more resources (such 
as valuable land or housing), their bargaining power is increased, and the model predicts that 
migrants will contribute more to the household welfare.  
    The household’s bargaining power is frequently linked to strategic property bequests that 
the household uses to entice the migrant into giving assistance. For instance, households may 
reward migrants’ cooperation by the promise of inheritance of land, household assets, or 
other forms of property (Hoddinot, 1994, VanWey 2004). Furthermore, migrants who fail to 
follow the expressed wishes of household heads could jeopardize their claim to inheritance 
rights. 
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    Two hypotheses can be deduced from the power and bargaining model. First, households 
with more resources (such as land or consumer durables) should be able to elicit more help 
from migrants by using these resources as a promise of strategic bequest. Second, migrants 
with more resources (such as higher education and more stable wage paying jobs) should 
contribute less labor to households because their bargaining power is higher and they are less 
susceptible to the influence of the promise of strategic bequests.  
    In my analysis I consider absolute rather than relative bargaining power of migrants and 
households, using human capital endowments and characteristics of the household as proxy 
indicators. This is reasonable because migrants’ and households’ bargaining power is 
concentrated along different dimensions. On the one hand, migrants may have high human 
capital endowments, but their aging parents usually have low levels of education and 
primarily work in farming12. On the other hand, migrants are probably not land owners, 
which is an asset possessed by most households.  
    Finding evidence for the power and bargaining model would suggest that familial 
intergenerational relations exhibit low dependency. Both households and migrants are simply 
instrumentally pursuing personal goals, rather than being dependent on family members. 
From the point of view of migrants, it indicates migrants with less stable and less 
remunerative relations with non-familial institutions (such as the workplace) are the most 
likely to participate in exchanges with households. The remaining migrants stop participating 
in household strategies once they secure stable or relatively high-wage positions. From the 
household’s perspective it proposes that households with the most desirable property can 
                                                 
12 This is certainly true of my analysis sample. Of the migrants who have a father living in the origin household, 
95 percent of these fathers have only compulsory education or less, and 92 percent are either employed as rice 
farmers or are unemployed. For migrants with mothers in the home household, 98 percent of those mothers 
have only compulsory education or lower and about 90 percent of them are either rice farmers or are 
unemployed. 
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expect to get the most help. Thus poorer households with no strategic property to use as a 
bequest are left to their own devices. In contrast to this model, the altruism/corporate group 
model and the mutual aid model predict greater household interdependence. 
Altruism/Corporate Group Model 
    The altruism/corporate group model describes a process in which household members 
strive to allocate wealth in a Pareto efficient manner, that is, resources are allocated across 
household members such that no alternative allocation could improve the welfare of any 
given household member without reducing the welfare of some other household member. 
This usually follows two stages. First, households try to maximize wealth attainment, and 
second, they try to optimally distribute the ensuing wealth.  
    The counterpart to this model in the migration literature is related to the New Economics 
of Migration’s theoretical arguments about investment and risk, the two underling 
components of the migrant-household arrangement. According to the investment argument, 
initial funds aimed at improving migrants’ human capital endowments (i.e. education) are 
borne by the household. Often this investment is selective and is aimed at maximizing wealth 
among household members. For instance, perhaps investment is made only on behalf of 
males, if these males can bring in higher wages13. In turn, the yields from this investment will 
be redistributed among other household members. For example, migrants with higher human 
capital endowments frequently earn more money, which they are expected to remit to the 
origin household to increase its welfare (Lucas and Stark 1985).  
    New Economics of Migration theorists have argued that households and migrants develop 
a coinsurance scheme to reduce risk (Lucas and Stark 1985, Stark and Lucas 1988). Such an 
                                                 
13 However this selective investment could bring higher returns that will benefit everyone. 
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arrangement can work in the following manner. Rural households send migrants to seek 
urban employment as a way of diversifying the household’s income flow in the face of risks 
from such things as crop failures, price fluctuations, insecurity of land tenancy, or livestock 
diseases. Meanwhile, the agrarian household facilitates the migrant’s initial efforts at finding 
employment by acting as an insurer against the risks of entry into employment sectors (i.e. 
the risk of unemployment). This is done either through household-to-migrant remittance or 
by giving the migrant a place to return if the need arises. This way the migrant gains from the 
initial investment.  
    Upon gaining sufficient place-specific capital, the migrant in turn acts as an insurer, by 
providing monetary support through remittance, allowing the household to engage in risk-
increasing ventures, such as technological change on the family farm. In this way, the 
household is able to generate wealth, which can be redistributed to other household members. 
    Hypotheses stemming from the altruism/corporate group model predict effects that run 
counter to effects predicted by the power and bargaining model. First, migrants with more 
resources, such as higher education, will likely contribute more labor, as a repayment for the 
household’s initial investment in the migrant (see Lillard and Willis 1997 for an empirical 
findings in favor of this argument). Second, households with fewer resources will be more 
likely to receive help from the migrant, because they are at higher exposure to various risks. 
Clearly, this household strategy involves relatively high dependency among family members. 
Inter-temporal repayment of investment and insurance schemes need to be carefully 
orchestrated and coordinated between family members in order to be effective. 
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    It is important to note that these hypotheses assume that agricultural help from migrants 
and migrant remittance are not substitutes for each other; although they very well could be14. 
Perhaps migrants substitute money for time by sending remittance in lieu of providing 
agricultural labor. Past research has suggested that adult children repay their parents for past 
care by substituting money for time. This is particularly true in contexts in which migrant 
remittances are substitutes for instrumental old age support given by adult children co-
residing with elderly parents (Rahman 1996, Zimmer and Kwong 2003). Perhaps household 
members optimize the use of labor and financial capital of various household members by 
requesting remittance from some while requesting rice harvest help from others. To evaluate 
the assumption that remittance and agricultural help are not substitutes for one another, I will 
examine the remittance patterns of both migrants who provide agricultural help and those 
who do not to see if they differ. 
Mutual Aid Model 
    The New Economics of Migration acknowledges the substantial temptation for both the 
household and the migrant to renege on their obligations. However, the nature of their 
relationship makes it unlikely that either side will do so, because these are family members, 
who are endowed with mutual altruism, which is akin to trust or loyalty. This assists both 
parties in solving problems that emerge when legally enforceable contracts are absent (Lucas 
and Stark 1985).  
    The mutual aid model is built upon this principle. It stresses that residential sharing and 
assistance among household members is driven by voluntary mutual assistance in the form of 
reciprocal exchanges, and it generally describes the kind of everyday transactions among 
household members that make households valuable and productive forms of social 
                                                 
14 See VanWey (2004) who treats similar issues with respect to migrant remittances. 
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organization. For instance, perhaps in exchange for providing help with agricultural labor, 
household members can help migrants during their absence, such as by taking care of the 
migrant’s children while the migrant has a factory job in a regional city. 
    The mutual aid model suggests that migrant help with agricultural labor is given in 
exchange for help provided by the household. Thus, a logical hypothesis stemming from this 
model is that migrants who receive household assistance (for example care for children 
during the migrant’s absence), will be more likely to contribute to household agricultural 
labor.  
    Unlike the power and bargaining model, both the altruism/corporate group model and the 
mutual aid model suggest a household strategy involving relatively high dependency among 
family members. The difference between the latter two models is that the former predicts 
distribution of family resources in an efficient manner, while the latter predicts exchanges of 
favors among family members, which do not necessarily strive to achieve the most efficient 
arrangement.    
    The effects of key variables are needed to differentiate among the three models. Variables 
related to everyday exchanges, such as the presence of migrants’ children in the household, 
can be used to evaluate the mutual aid model. Variables related to inter-temporal investment 
(such as education) or related to coinsurance (such as occupation), can be used to provide 
evidence for the altruism/corporate group model. Under the altruism/corporate group model 
higher human capital attributes (higher education, more stable higher-paying wage jobs) 
predict a higher likelihood of giving help.  
    The power and bargaining model predicts the opposite effects for human capital variables, 
because these increase the bargaining power of young migrants. Characteristics of the 
 77
household (ownership of valuable land or working assets) can also be used to distinguish 
between the altruism/corporate group model and the power and bargaining model. The 
former model predicts that households with fewer resources should expect to get more help, 
while the latter model predicts the opposite, which is consistent with a strategic property 
bequest motive. 
Setting 
    Nang Rong is a small, predominantly rural, district located in Buriram province, Northeast 
Thailand. It is about the size of an eastern U.S. county. The district was a frontier region 
during the first six decades of the 20th century. The frontier closed during the 1970s and 
1980s, when road construction, electrification, telecommunications, and migration 
substantially changed the way that people lived (Curran, 1995, Rindfuss et al 2005, VanWey 
2003). In 1984 only one-third of villages had electricity, while in 2000 nearly every 
household in the sample villages had electricity (Rindfuss et al. 2005). Although some 
industrial development in the district has led to scattered industry, the level of non-
agricultural employment provided is very low (VanWey 2003). 
    Like the rest of Northeast Thailand, rain-fed paddy rice cultivation is central to the 
economy. Most Nang Rong residents are poor subsistence farmers who sell only their excess 
yields. Some grow upland cash crops like cassava for export to foreign markets (Curran 
2005). Households usually farm small plots that are located in agricultural fields surrounding 
nucleated villages.  
    Land is a crucial source of employment and income in Nang Rong (VanWey 2003). 
Inheritance is the dominant mechanism whereby land is transferred among villagers. Nang 
Rong does not have an active land sales market, and no real estate specialists serve the 
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villages. Although land is rarely sold, there is an active rental market, and households that 
own more rice land than they can farm usually rent out excess land. Renters typically pay 
with a share of the yield rather than cash (Rindfuss et al. 2006). 
    Deeds and titles for the plots exhibit considerable variation because of the nature of the 
expansion of cultivatable land and the government’s initiatives to institute a formal titling 
system. It is important to understand the nature of this variability because land is among the 
most valuable inheritable property sought by young people. Land that is securely titled may 
represent a significant strategic property bequest that households can use to persuade 
migrants to help with the rice harvest. 
    The history of land titling is described in detail by Feder et al. (1988). During a time when 
all land belonged to the Thai king, Thai citizens could claim land in order to provide for their 
families. Widespread clearing of forests, settlement, and cultivation were permitted with few 
restrictions and little government control. Rights to land were customary rather than formally 
recorded. Although earlier attempts were made to institute a land title system, it was the Land 
Code of 1954 which is the basis for the legal system of land rights used in Thailand today.  
    Under the Land Code, farmers were able to acquire secure titles which established full 
ownership rights enabling the farmer to legally sell, mortgage, or bequeath the land. The 
Land Code defined the power and duties for the allocation and acquisition of state land to 
reside with the Department of Lands (DOL). In addition to secure titles, the Department of 
Land also issued Preemptive Certificates for temporary use of land and Claim Certificates for 
land possessed and used prior to the passage of the Land Code. Other land titles include 
usufruct certificates issued by the Royal Forestry Department in 1981, which grant temporary 
cultivation rights to squatters in forest reserves. In addition, there are a number of other 
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documents issued by various government agencies that confer some rights to land within the 
purview of specific settlement and welfare programs. 
    Most Nang Rong households grow rice, and so, face the issue of harvesting it. The rice 
harvest is particularly sensitive to features of the agricultural cycle and can require a great 
deal of labor in a short time period. Toward the end of the wet season, once the rains have 
ceased and the fields are drained, rice harvesting must be finished quickly, because it is at 
risk of crop damage (Entwisle et. al 2005). 
    Crop damage can come from a number of sources, all of which become more problematic 
the longer the rice is left in the fields (Hull 2005, Rajadhon 1955). One source is the ever-
present risk of insects and pests, which can damage the rice stalks. Another problem is that 
rice stalks tend to fall over from the weight of mature heads, which is known as lodging. 
Lodging causes rice stalks to fall in random directions, which results in a tangle of rice stalks 
that are difficult to harvest. Another problem is that rice becomes drier and more brittle the 
longer it stays in the field. This significantly reduces the yield. 
    It is important to understand that rice harvesting coincides with the beginning of the dry 
season in Thailand’s monsoon climate. During midday when the sun is directly overhead, it 
is extremely hot. This limits the amount of time that can be spent harvesting rice (Hull 2005, 
Rajadhon 1955). Harvesting is still done in the traditional manner: rice stalks are cut by hand, 
using a small sickle or knife. Because of the size of the fields, using large tractors would ruin 
the elevated bunds that hold water in the paddy fields (Entwisle et. al 2005). Reaping and 
gathering rice stalks can be extremely labor-intensive, and even households with small land 
holdings may have difficulty harvesting their crop quickly without help (Hull 2005). 
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Migration in Patterns Thailand 
    Throughout Thailand between 1965 and 1990, rural-to-rural migration was the dominant 
form (Pejaranonda et al. 1995), which is probably related to marriage. However, a decline in 
rural-to-rural migration occurred in tandem with an increase of rural-to-urban. Thailand’s 
Northeast region, in which Nang Rong is located, became the major sending region 
(Chamratrithirong et al. 1995, Pejaranonda et al. 1995).  
    Typically the majority of migrants go to urban destinations, while a sizeable minority 
move to rural areas. Very few go to international destinations. Major destinations for urban 
migrants include Metropolitan Bangkok, the Eastern Seaboard, and to regional cities like 
Korat.15  Bangkok, the most popular urban destination, is about a four hour bus ride from 
Nang Rong town.  
    To explain the increase in rural-to-urban migration from the Northeast, researchers (e.g. 
Chamratrithirong et al. 1995, Goldstein 1987, Pejaranonda et al. 1995) cite historical 
development efforts directed at the region, which was the poorest in Thailand. These 
development efforts raised aspirations while doing little to create local employment 
opportunities. Among the development efforts were new employment opportunities 
concentrated in urban-based service and manufacturing industries; rising levels of education, 
which have increased aspirations for employment in non-agricultural employment; and 
social, transportation, and information networks which link the Northeast and Bangkok. 
                                                 
15 Korat (formally known as Nakhon Ratchasima) is a nearby provincial city, the largest city in the Northeast. 
The Eastern Seaboard Development Project was a major public-private joint venture carried out in three 
provinces in Thailand (Chonburi, Rayong, and Chacheongsao) during the late 1980s. The project sought to 
stimulate regional economic development, and to decentralize economic activity away from Bangkok. The plan 
called for investment in heavy and light industry development, tourism, and deep sea ports which were 
developed for the exploration of natural gas in the Gulf of Thailand (Shatkin 2004). 
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    Much of migration in Nang Rong is temporary or circular migration, and is linked to labor 
demand fluctuations related to the agricultural cycle (Chamratrithirong et al. 1995). Richter, 
et al. (1997), using a sample of Northeast households from a follow-up to the National 
Migration Survey, confirm earlier findings about the prevalence of temporary migration. 
    Richter et al (1997) report that just under half of the migrants16 in their sample (40%) 
reported that seasonal factors in their home areas were involved in their decision to migrate. 
Furthermore, seasonal cycles involved in rice farming were a major determinant of migration 
for many rural residents. These authors’ findings suggest that the peak for seasonal migrants 
occurred around the months of December or January, during the dry season, an idle season 
from an agricultural perspective. They also note that a higher than average amount of 
seasonal and repeat migration occurred in September, just before the harvest season in 
November and December. 
Data 
    To test the above hypotheses, I use data from the 1984 and 199417 waves of the 
longitudinal study of social change in Nang Rong, Thailand18. In 1984, the first wave of the 
study data was collected on all households living in a sample of 51 Nang Rong villages. 
Information was obtained on all household members, including those who were permanent 
residents and proxy reports for migrants. A subsequent wave of data collection occurred in 
1994, at which time a complete census was again conducted of each of the 51 villages. The 
1994 wave includes a household survey with data on social and demographic information 
                                                 
16 Migrants were defined as anyone who was living outside of their home district for at least one month prior to 
the implementation of the survey. 
 
17 Although another wave of data was collected in 2000, it includes information on land use but not on land 
ownership. Land ownership is a key variable in my analysis, so I opt to use data from the 1994 wave. 
 
18 For more details on the Nang Rong data see http://www.cpc.unc.edu/projects/nangrong/data; also see 
Entwisle et al. 1996, Godley 2001, Vanwey 2003. 
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regarding household composition, migration, land use, and complete household network data 
on sibling ties and rice harvest help ties. 
    The Nang Rong data are excellent for examining the hypotheses described above. The data 
contains a full household census, which includes all permanent residents, new residents 
between survey waves, as well as those who were gone for more than two months prior to the 
new survey wave. Data were collected on household assets, agricultural equipment, land use 
status, characteristics of land plots, and details of the household’s harvesting of rice.  
Basic Approach 
    Using the Nang Rong data, I estimate a series of regressions to examine the three models 
of household strategies described above. One complication is whether the migrant’s 
household actually grows rice, and about 18 percent of households do not grow rice. Clearly, 
migrants cannot return to the home household to help with the harvest if that household does 
not grow rice. Further, a household’s decision to stop growing rice may itself be the result of 
individuals migrating, and thus not having enough help to plow, plant, transplant, and harvest 
rice. Excluding households that did not grow rice from the analysis of migrant labor may lead 
to selectivity bias.  
    I checked for possible selectivity bias by estimating of a series of regression equations, 
which make different assumptions about selectivity bias. First, I estimated an equation that 
excludes households that did not grow rice. Next, using the full sample, I estimated a 
Heckman sample selection model (Heckman 1979) that simultaneously estimates a selection 
equation (predicting whether the household grew rice) and a substantive equation (predicting 
whether the migrant came to help with the rice harvest). Third, I estimated an equation that 
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uses the full sample, including households that did not grow rice, in which I constrain 
migrants from non-rice-growing households to not come back to help with the rice harvest. 
    Evidence that is relevant to the question of whether there is sample selection can come 
from two sources. First, the Heckman model can be used to calculate rho (ρ), which is the 
correlation between error terms in the substantive equation and the selection equation. When 
ρ is equal to zero, unmeasured variables in the selection equation are unrelated to 
unmeasured variables in the substantive equation, and regression coefficients are unbiased or 
unaffected by selection. Second, one can simply compare coefficient estimates between the 
results of models which include the entire sample to the sample which excludes non-rice-
growing household, to see if the estimates are consistent throughout. 
    Results from the Heckman model provide no evidence that a household’s decision to grow 
rice is related to the migrant’s decision to help with the rice harvest; that is, ρ is not 
statistically different from zero. Also, coefficient estimates across the three models are fairly 
robust, suggesting that sample selectivity is not influencing results. I present results for only 
the first equation (which excludes households not growing rice). Results for the Heckman 
model and for the full sample (which includes households that do not grow rice) are shown in 
Appendix 2. 
    Another source of selectivity bias could be related to the exclusion of households that do 
not have any migrants. About 21 percent of households who have someone age 18-35 living 
in them have no migrants. Since I only have data for rice harvest help from migrants, I 
cannot simultaneously model the selection into migration and help with the rice harvest. 
Instead, I determine whether any observable variables used in my model may be biased by 
comparing these variables across households with migrants and households without migrants. 
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Of course, this approach does not take into account unobserved variables and the endogenous 
processes of self-selection into migration and return to help with the rice harvest. 
    I proceed as follows. First I create an indicator variable for whether a household 
containing anyone age 18-35 had any migrants or no migrant (the latter were not included in 
the original analysis). Then I estimate a logistic regression in which this variable is the 
dependent variable and any household or village variables used in my analysis are 
independent variables. Results (not shown) suggest that only one variable differs between 
migrant and non-migrant households. The effect of household wealth for the highest wealth 
category (relative to the middle category) is statistically significant and positively associated 
with households with migrants. Therefore the effect of this variable may be somewhat biased 
in my final models. 
Operationalization of Key Measures and Method 
    Help with the rice harvest, the dependent variable of substantive interest, is operationalized 
as a two-category variable indicating whether a migrant returned to help with the rice harvest 
in the 1994 growing season. Because the outcome is dichotomous, I use a logit specification. 
The model can be written: 
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where Yi is defined as help with the rice harvest provided by migrant i, and β′Xi is matrix 
notation for the linear predictor, which is the linear combination of independent variables 
measured at the individual and household level.  
    Table 3.1 shows the frequency distribution of the dependent variable. About 11% of 
migrants helped with the rice harvest. Coming back to help reflects a number characteristics 
of the migrants and households. For migrants these characteristics may include occupation or 
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marital status. Sample migrants could have been gone for as many as ten or more years. In 
that time, some of them could have developed other responsibilities at destination which 
make it difficult for them to return. Perhaps their employment situation prohibited them from 
taking the time to travel back to their home villages for extended periods of time to help with 
their households’ harvests. Maybe some of them got married and developed obligations to 
help with the harvest of their spouses’ families. 
    The fact that many migrants did not help with the harvest could also suggest that 
households may not need migrant labor to help them with the rice harvest. Perhaps local 
sources are sufficiently available or inexpensive to meet the demand for harvest labor.  
Prior work on rice harvest help by Entwisle et al. (2005) has shown that almost a quarter 
(27%) of households got help with the rice harvest from other people in the village, while 
28% of households got help from people living outside the village. Interestingly, the 
percentage of households that received help (28%) is higher than the percentage of migrants 
that provide help (11%). This may suggest that while multiple migrants from each household 
could potentially help with the harvest, only a few of them actually do so. It could also 
suggest that households are getting help from individuals outside of the village other than 
migrant household members. 
    Migrants are the units of analysis. They are individuals who lived in the household in 
1984, or were temporarily absent in 1984, and who were not in the village in 1994 (having 
been gone for at least two months). The analysis sample is limited to a cohort of adult 
migrants age 18 to 35 in 1994, who are young enough to have parents who are still active in 
agricultural production. 
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    Since multiple migrants can come from a household, and multiple households live in a 
village, the data are clustered, and thus not independent of each other. The model must 
account for the nested structure, or levels, of the data. This is important because each 
observation contributes less information than it is assumed to, which artificially lowers 
standard errors associated with coefficients, thereby overestimating t-statistics and 
overstating the significance of estimates. To account for this, I randomly select one migrant 
from each household, eliminating the clustering of migrants within households. To account 
for clustering of households in villagers, I use a robust standard error correction (White, 
1980) at the village level. 
Operationalization of Independent Variables 
    Descriptive statistics for all independent variables are in Table 3.2. Land is the first 
indicator of the household’s relative bargaining power. Inheritance of land is a basic social 
security strategy in rural areas of developing countries, especially for rural-to-urban migrants 
who may pursue employment in the informal labor sector without a basic social security 
system or a pension or retirement plan. Land provides an investment opportunity, in addition 
to providing employment and a livelihood for rural residents. Also, land is often the primary 
source of collateral used to obtain bank loans in parts of rural Thailand (Feder et al. 1988; 
Routray and Sahoo 1995). Migrants who help with agricultural labor may be doing so in 
anticipation of someday inheriting land. 
    Land inheritance in Thailand is described in detail by Feder et al. (1988). As noted above, 
land titling in Thailand can range from securely titled land to land that is certified for use by 
squatters. The most securely titled land in Thailand is that which has a titled deed (Chanod), 
or what is commonly referred to by the Thai acronym NS-4. Such a title gives the owner full 
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unrestricted ownership of the land, which can be sold, rented, subdivided, or mortgaged. The 
next most secure title is a certificate of use or NS-3 (Nor Sor Sarm). The possessor of such a 
deed can sell, transfer, or mortgage land, and can opt to convert the certificate into a titled 
deed (NS-4). In addition to being the most secure titles, these are the only documents that can 
be used as collateral to obtain bank loans19.  
    Other land titles are less secure, have much more restrictive transfer provisions, and cannot 
be used as collateral. For instance, the Department of Lands also issued preemptive 
certificates, or NS-2 (Bai-Chong). NS-2 authorizes the temporary occupation of land, but 
restricts transfer of land to inheritance only. Also, it confers validity of rights on the 
condition that the land is used within six months of issuance. In 1981, the Royal Forestry 
Department issued usufruct certificates to large numbers of squatters in forest reserves. These 
usufruct certificates, known by their Thai acronym STK (Sor Tor Kor) provide temporary 
cultivation rights, but prohibit the transfer of land by any means other than inheritance. 
Another example is SPK (Sor Por Kor) documents, which the Land Reform Office issued as 
an analogous document to the STK certificates issued by the Forestry Department. SPK were 
also relatively less secure, only transferable via inheritance, and cannot be used as collateral.    
    I operationalize household land as a series of variables that count the number of plots and 
the amount of land designated under various land titles. Preliminary analysis showed that 
migrants were reacting similarly to the two securely titled types of deeds. Therefore I 
grouped together NS-4 and NS-3 titled land, and I also grouped SPK, STK, and NS-2 land 
together. The former are the most securely titled land, and the only land that be used as 
                                                 
19 Specialized institutions, such as the Bank of Agriculture and Agricultural Cooperatives (BAAC) were 
established to alleviate credit restraints in parts of rural Thailand. The BAAC offers short-term and medium-
term loans with collateral security. Immovable property (mainly land) is the prime collateral offered by 
borrowers. Titled land which is transferable is the only acceptable form of collateral, thus only farmers with the 
most secure titles can use land as collateral (Routray and Sahoo 1995). 
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collateral. The latter are the least secure titles, which cannot be transferred except by 
inheritance, and are not accepted as collateral.  
    From Table 3.2, it can be seen that households can own anywhere from zero to ten NS-4 / 
NS-3 land plots, while the amount of this land ranges from zero to 101,000 square wa20. On 
average households own almost two plots, with a total amount of land of just over six wa2. 
For the less secure land (NS-2/SPK/STP) households owned between zero to 88 square wa of 
land, with an average of just over two wa21.  
    If the power and bargaining hypothesis is correct, households with the most securely titled 
land (NS-4, NS-3) should be the most likely to use this land as a strategic bequest. Therefore 
they should receive more agricultural help from migrants. The altruism/corporate group 
model predicts the opposite.    
    In addition to land, I also look at the independent effect of consumer assets on migrants’ 
helping with the harvest. Since monetary values for assets are unavailable, I follow work by 
Filmer and Pritchett (2001) and create a household wealth index, based on the presence of 
various consumer durables. The procedure uses principal components analysis. This index 
includes data on the number of black and white televisions, color televisions, VCRs, 
refrigerators, Itans (agricultural trucks), cars/trucks/pickups, motorcycles, and sewing 
machines. In addition, I include dummy variables for whether a household cooks with 
electricity or gas, and has windows with wood shutters, glass panes, or bug screens. 
                                                 
20 Wa is a Thai unit of measurement, one Wa is equal to approximately two meters.  
 
21 Less secure land was not found to be significantly related to help with the rice harvest. I only include one 
measure of this type of land (the amount of land) in my final models to show that help with the rice harvest is 
not associated to need for help as related to the amount of land a household owns. Households who own more 
land can potentially grow more rice and may have more need to harvest it. 
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    Each household is grouped into one of three categories, based on its overall household 
wealth index score. Since wealth often tends to be clustered at the top of a wealth 
distribution, I include relatively fewer households in the top of the distribution than at the 
bottom. Specifically, households in the lowest third will be considered to be at the “bottom,” 
those in the 34th to 79th percentiles will be considered “middle,” and the highest fifth will be 
considered to be at the “top”.  
    A disproportionate share of households in the various wealth categories results, due to 
differences in the population of households used in the construction of the index and the 
sample used for the present analysis. In calculating household wealth, I used all households 
from all sample villages, while my sampling strategy only selected households with a 
migrant in the age range 18 – 35. From Table 3.2, one can observe that about 20 percent of 
the analysis sample households are in the top quintile of household wealth. Also, just about 
41 percent of analysis sample households are in the poorest wealth category and 39 percent 
are in the middle category.    
    Turning to characteristics of the migrant, I argue that higher human capital variables (such 
as education and occupation) increase the migrants’ bargaining power. It also increases the 
ability to send cash. I operationalize education as a series of dummy variables indicating 
whether the migrant completed less than primary school, primary school only, or greater than 
primary school. Only a minority of migrants have more than a primary school education 
(17%) and just under a third (30%) of migrants have less than a primary school education.  
    I distinguish between the following occupations: agricultural, commerce, government, and 
miscellaneous other22. I expect those working in government jobs (about five percent of the 
                                                 
22 Government workers include mainly police officers, soldiers, teachers, security guards and janitors. Laborers 
are roughly equally divided among auto or furniture repair employees; factory workers; construction workers, 
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sample) have more stable and remunerative positions relative to all other occupations. 
Laborers and commerce workers, who make up about 46 and two percent of the sample 
respectively, are likely to have similar working conditions. Those working in agriculture 
(about 42 percent of the total) probably have the least stable and remunerative positions, but 
they may have the needed flexibility to take a leave of absence which would enable them to 
help with the rice harvest.  
    If the power and bargaining model is correct, there should be a detectable difference in 
help based on earning potential and job stability (i.e. the difference between government 
workers and all other workers). The difference in help should not be solely due to the 
difference in work in the informal sector (agricultural workers) versus the formal sector 
(other workers). Such a difference would most likely be related to the migrants’ ability to 
leave work without the risk of losing their jobs. 
    In Thailand, parents who migrate from rural areas to cities frequently leave children 
behind in the care of relatives, especially the children’s grandparents (Richter et al. 1992, 
Richter et al. 1994, Richter 1997). The mutual aid model predicts that voluntary quid-pro-
quo exchanges among household members constitute the basis of resource sharing within the 
household. To test the predictions of the mutual aid model, I include a measure of the 
location of the migrant’s children, which measures whether any of the migrants’ children live 
in the home household. The mutual aid model would predict that migrants who receive child 
rearing assistance from their household should be more likely to reciprocate help, perhaps by 
                                                                                                                                                       
carpenters, masons, well drillers; and general laborers, workers in rice mills, unskilled laborers. Those in 
commerce work as salesperson and small shopkeepers. The majority of agricultural labors list rice farming as 
their primary occupation. Data on the migrant’s occupation come from proxy reports from an informant in each 
household.  
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providing agricultural labor during the harvest season. They may also take the occasion to 
visit their children. 
Control Variables 
    The rest of the covariates serve primarily as control variables. There are three types: the 
location of key family members of the migrant, household demographics, and characteristics 
of the migrant.  
    The migrant’s decision to help the household may be directed at particular individuals 
living within the household, and not at the household as a whole. Therefore I considered the 
location of the migrant’s spouse and parents. In Thailand, postnuptial residence often follows 
the culturally preferred matrilocal pattern, with young couples temporarily residing with the 
wife’s parents. Given the “loosely structured” nature of Thai society, newly married couples 
may live anywhere, but they are expected to, and commonly do, live with the bride’s parents. 
This is a temporary arrangement that lasts until either the couple’s first child is born, or the 
parent’s next daughter marries (Knodel et al. 1995, Limanonda 1995, Limanonda and 
Kowantanakul 2002, Tan 2002). Married couples may also choose a living arrangement in 
which one of the marriage partners migrates alone for some period of time. I distinguish 
among migrants who are married and have a spouse living in the home household or village, 
married and have a spouse living in the same destination outside the village, married and 
living in a different location outside the village, post-married or whose spouse’s location is 
unknown23, and never-married.  
    Migrants whose spouse lives in the home household or village should be the most likely to 
help the household with the rice harvest, while those whose spouse lives outside the village 
                                                 
23 The coefficient for the effect of this variable should not be interpreted. This variable is included merely to 
avoid unnecessarily deleting cases. 
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will be the least likely to help. The latter migrants may reside within their spouse’s family. 
They are most likely obligated to provide help to their spouse’s household. Migrants who 
live with their spouse in the same migration destination should be less likely to help their 
home household because they probably already started their own new household, for which 
they have responsibilities.  
    Thai customs are not only important to understanding the influence of spouses on the 
behavior of their marital partners, but also in understanding the influence of parents on the 
behavior of their children. Filial piety is the norm in Thailand, which is related to Buddhist 
practices (Knodel et al. 1995). Children pay off parental debt in gratitude for the efforts their 
parents made in giving them birth and in raising them. However, there are gender differences 
in the ways that men and women repay parental debt associated with filial piety. Males pay 
off their debt by becoming monks, while females pay off their debt by helping parents with 
household labor and caring for them in their old age (Chamratrithirong et al. 1988, 
Limanonda 1995). Therefore I expect that females should provide more help than males, and 
I control for sex to account for gender differences in filial obligations. 
    To consider the influence of parents, I include variables measuring whether both parents 
live in the home household, only the mother lives in the household, only the father lives in 
the household, or neither parent lives in the household. I expect migrants to be more likely to 
help households where parents are residing, and there may be differences regarding help to 
widowed or divorced parents. Table 3.2 shows that having both parents living in the 
household is the most common living arrangement (67 percent of the sample). Having only 
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the father in the household is rare. Only 11 percent of households have neither parent living 
in them24.  
    I also control for household demographic variables. First, I count the number of siblings 
living in the household25. Because of changes in vital rates in Thailand (see Knodel et al. 
1987), this generation of Thais tends to have many siblings. Siblings represent alternative 
sources of aid and they compete with migrants for resources. The presence of siblings may be 
particularly relevant to inheritance of land or assets. The customary inheritance practice is for 
all siblings to receive equal shares, although children who remain to care for elderly parents 
often inherit more land (Knodel et al. 1995). Having many siblings may indicate high fertility 
or a late stage in the household life cycle where parents are on the verge of transferring 
family property or have already done so.  
    Second, I also count the number of household members of working and non-working age, 
with ages 13 to 60 considered working age. In Nang Rong, young adults begin to migrate to 
find jobs around age 13, when compulsory education ends (Rindfuss et al. 2005). 
Furthermore, by age 60, many are beginning to be unable to participate in strenuous 
agricultural work. I expect that the number of working age household members is related to a 
household’s relative supply and demand of labor. On the one hand, working age people, who 
are able to provide agricultural labor, should discourage the migrant from coming back. On 
the other hand, non-working age dependents will encourage the migrant to come and help. 
                                                 
24 Indeed among both migrants who help with the rice harvest, and those who do not, a majority (over 80% of 
both) are children of the household head. I also include in-law parents in my counts because sons and 
daughters-in-law may feel similar pressure to help their spouse’s parents. I also include in-law in my count of 
siblings. 
 
25 As the youngest daughter is expected to care for parents, it is common for her to receive a larger share 
relative to the other siblings (Fukui 1993). To examine this, I tried disaggregating the count of siblings by 
gender, although doing so did not yield substantively different results. Therefore, such a distinction was 
ultimately not made in the final models. 
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    I also consider the influence of other household migrants. Migrants, who are selectively 
drawn from among the younger and most able portion of the population could also represent 
alternative sources of labor and competition for resources. Therefore, I expect that 
households with more migrants will be less likely to have the focal migrant help them with 
the rice harvest.  
    I also control for the migrant’s age. Aging and human development are lifelong processes, 
in which individual life courses are embedded in and shaped by historical events and 
interlocking, interdependent, and reciprocal exchanges among networks of relations (Elder 
1994). Because the analysis sample is relatively young (18 – 35), they vary in their 
dependence on their natal households. Their obligation and to dependence on their home 
household will wane as they age. As such, it is likely that increasing age will be associated 
with less agricultural help. 
Results 
    Table 3.3 shows logistic regression results (raw coefficients, standard errors, and odds 
ratios). I consider first the variables that evaluate the central hypotheses26. The effects of the 
land variables lend firm support to the bequest argument. Starting with the most securely 
titled land, the results show that as the number of plots of NS-4/NS-3 land increases, 
migrants are more likely to help with the rice harvest, with the odds of helping increasing by 
about 21 percent for an increase in one securely titled plot. Also, as the amount of securely 
titled land increases, so does the propensity for a migrant to help with the rice harvest (Model 
2). The less securely titled land has no effect (see Model 3). Clearly, migrants are responding 
                                                 
26 In results not shown I also included controls for the number of people, other than the focal migrant, who 
helped with the rice harvest (both inside and outside the village) as well as a control for migration destination. 
As these variables are endogenous with the dependent variable I exclude them from the final models. Results 
are not sensitive to changes in this model specification. 
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to the availability or inheritability of securely titled or quality land27. Household wealth had 
no effect on migrant help, which may suggest that land is the most valuable and sought after 
asset. 
    The effects of migrant human capital variables support the power and bargaining model. 
Migrants who have completed more than a primary school education are less likely to help 
with the rice harvest. The odds of them doing so are 65 to 68 percent lower than those with 
only a primary school education. The effect of education is consistent with the power and 
bargaining model. Migrants who are better educated are not providing more help as 
repayment for the household’s initial investment in their education as the altruism/corporate 
group model would suggest. Instead they provide less help, as suggested by the power and 
bargaining model; they are less reliant on the household for support.  
    Also, migrants working in agriculture are more likely to help with the rice harvest 
compared to laborers. In results not shown, I used agricultural occupation as the reference 
category. I found that migrants working in any non-agricultural occupations were less likely 
to help with the rice harvest relative to agricultural workers. Given that there are no 
differences between government workers and laborers or commerce workers (see Table 3.3), 
the effect of agricultural occupation is likely to be related to the flexibility of working in the 
non-formal sector or the seasonality of agricultural work.  
    It is possible that migrants with higher human capital endowments earn more, and are able 
to help the household in other ways, such as through remittance. Figure 3.1 shows a 
comparison of migrant-to-household remittance between migrants who help with the rice 
harvest and those who do not. Results indicate that remittance (financial support) is unlikely 
to be a substitute for help with agricultural labor (instrumental support). For nearly every 
                                                 
27 Unfortunately, other measures of land quality (e.g. soil fertility and location) are not available. 
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amount of remittance, migrants who help with the rice harvest are also more likely to send 
remittance. Just under half of migrants who did not help with the rice harvest sent no 
remittance, while nearly 35% of migrants who helped with the rice harvest sent no 
remittance. Furthermore, a higher percentage of migrants who helped with the rice harvest 
sent between 1 and 1,000 Baht in remittances and between 1,001 to 3,000 Baht in 
remittances. Although migrants who did not help with the rice harvest were slightly more 
likely to send remittances in the highest amount categories, the number of remitters in those 
categories is small, indicating a rare strategy. 
    There is also anecdotal evidence that migrants who help with the rice harvest are seasonal 
migrants, and their migration is attuned to the seasonal demand of agricultural work cycles. 
In results not shown, I find that the duration of migration among the majority (over 60%) of 
migrants who help with the rice harvest is less than one year. The corresponding percentage 
for those who do not help is 20%.   
    The effect of having a child living in the household is in line with the predictions of the 
mutual aid model. Migrants who have at least one child living in the household are more 
likely to return to help with the rice harvest. The odds of them doing so are two times as high 
as the odds of migrants whose children do not live in the household. It is likely the case that 
migrant parents who leave their children behind in the care of relatives are reciprocating such 
voluntary assistance by helping with the rice harvest. They also use the occasion to visit their 
children. 
    The control variables suggest that migrants may be responding to the presence of certain 
individuals, rather than the household as a whole. As expected, migrants whose spouse lives 
in a different location outside of the village are less likely to help with the rice harvest. In 
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fact, the odds of a migrant whose spouse lives in a different location than the migrant 
(somewhere outside of the village) helping with the rice harvest are about 45 percent lower 
relative to the odds of an unmarried migrant helping with the rice harvest28. These migrants 
may be obligated to helping their in-laws with their rice harvest or they may have their own 
harvest. Such an arrangement may indicate the establishment of a separate household, which 
competes as a source of the migrants’ obligations. 
    Overall there is little evidence that agricultural help is related to parental support. Migrants 
are no more likely to help a household if both parents live in it than if neither parent lives in 
it. The one exception is the presence of only the mother, but this effect is not consistent 
across all models and should be interpreted with caution.  
    Siblings and working-age people also influence a migrant’s decision to provide 
agricultural labor. The odds of a migrant helping with the rice harvest decrease by about 17 
to 19 percent with an increase in one sibling in the household. With more siblings, focal 
migrants tend not to help with the rice harvest. Perhaps siblings provide a sufficient supply of 
labor to keep the migrant from returning.   
    A similar effect can be observed for the number of working-age people living in the 
household. As the number of working-age people increases, migrants are less likely to help 
with the rice harvest. Other working-age people either may provide the necessary agricultural 
labor or they compete with the migrant for inheritable assets. Either way, migrants are less 
likely to provide help. 
                                                 
28 In the Heckman model, the effect of being married and having a spouse live in the household is also 
significant, and the effect is in the expected direction. The effect is not robust across types of model 
specification, although it is nearly significant in the remaining models. Also, the effect of only the mother living 
in the household is consistent across the other model specifications. 
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    There are a few remaining effects that are worth mentioning. The age of the migrant is a 
significant determinant of rice harvest help. Age is negatively related to help with the rice 
harvest. Recalling that this is a young adult sample, it seems reasonable to expect that older 
migrants have probably experienced a number of life course transitions (perhaps marriage 
and childbearing) that have made it more difficult to help their natal household.  
    The main effect of gender is not significant. Nonetheless I estimated separate models for 
males and females (results not shown). There were no gender differences for key variables 
(land variables and human capital variables) and results were consistent with effects 
presented in the final model. However, differences were detected for a few control variables. 
For instance, the effect of being married and having a migrant spouse (living either in the 
same location or a different location) was only found for males. Also, males were found to 
help with the rice harvest when the only parent in the household is the mother. Furthermore, 
the negative age effect was only found for women. 
Discussion and Conclusion 
    In this paper I examined agricultural labor, in the form of help with the rice harvest, 
provided by migrants to their home households. The main aim was to examine the household 
strategies that migrants engage in with their origin households in order to make inferences 
about the interdependency of family members, which may be related to loss of family 
function. 
    Although there is evidence for all three household strategies, suggesting a variety of 
motivations, the power and bargaining model received more support than the altruism 
corporate group model. The power and bargaining model emphasizes power relationships 
that decide differential levels of losses and gains in the struggle for household resources. The 
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strongest evidence for this model is the effect of securely titled land, which is most likely 
being used by households as a strategic property bequest. Further evidence is given by the 
effect of human capital characteristics of the migrant (education and occupation).   
    The most educated migrants and migrants who work in relatively stable and higher-paying 
jobs were less likely to help with the rice harvest, relative to migrants with lower levels of 
human capital. This does not seem to be because they sent remittances as a substitute for 
agricultural help. There is a suggestion that the occupation effect may be due to the flexibility 
working in the non-formal sector. Results suggest that the bargaining power of both the 
migrant and of the household significantly determine the level of mutual assistance within 
households.  
    The power and bargaining model has implications for intergenerational relations and 
interdependency among family members. Social and economic changes that accompany the 
transition from a subsistence economy into an industrial economy have led to a loss of family 
function and a reduction of interdependency within families. This may suggest that 
individual people are adapting and reshaping life plans and household strategies to meet new 
circumstances and the changing social reality. These findings are in accordance with the life 
course perspective (Elder 1994; Elder and Konger 2000; Hareven 2000). 
    The loss of production and education functions to non-familial institutions seems to 
undermine traditional roles within families and households. Once young people turn their 
human capital into wage positions, they are no longer dependent on the household as the sole 
source of property and security, and they are less likely to return to rural areas to help their 
parents’ generation. For the older generation, their children’s obligations to contribute to 
household production remain unfulfilled, unless secure land holdings can be used to entice 
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children into coming back to help. Land may continue to be a sought after resource, even for 
young people who have no intention of farming it. They may rent it out to generate extra 
income, or perhaps they could keep the land as an eventual retirement site. They might even 
have sentimental attachment to the family homestead. 
    This may portend problems for those in the senior generation who own smaller, relatively 
less secure landholdings, for whom less help may be forthcoming. It was secure land that 
motivated them. Long term, such differential help could lead to inequality between Nang 
Rong residents, as those with fewer resources (i.e. less secure land) may have to rely 
increasingly on non-family labor, perhaps in the form of paid labor. It could also presage rifts 
in social support among household members as more people in Nang Rong achieve higher 
levels of educational attainment and more stable jobs.  
    Support for the loss of family function is not unequivocal. There is also support for the 
mutual aid model, which suggests the family members exchange services among themselves. 
There is evidence that migrants are helping with the rice harvest in exchange for childrearing 
aid from the household. Such exchange of aid is likely to be especially related to family 
functions that have not experienced a transition to more formal institutions. Childcare as a 
formal institution is still developing in Thailand (Richter et al. 1992, Richter et al. 1994, 
Richter 1997). If Thai society follows the historic pattern found in developed countries 
(Presser 1989), someday more formal childcare institutions may replace existing care 
provided by kin. This may also explain why migrants are more likely to help their widowed 
mothers. Formal institutions like social security and retirement are not available in rural 
Thailand, but this too may change as they begin to develop to meet the needs of dependant 
elderly. 
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    A few other results are worth mentioning. Descriptive results show that migrants who help 
with the harvest are much more likely to have been gone for less than one year, which may 
indicate that migrants who provide help with the rice harvest are seasonal migrants. Perhaps 
these migrants move for a short period of time during the agricultural off-season and time 
their return to coincide with a peak in labor associated with the harvest. They might also 
return for first year or two and then stop migrating. In short, they are still part of the fabric of 
village life and have more on-going ties and interactions with the household of origin.  
    Results may also indicate that households value equity among siblings when making 
bequests. Perhaps there is a trade-off between land inheritance and investment in schooling, 
whereby those who get more land receive less education. Such a pattern has been suggested 
in parts of Thailand (De Jong, et al. 1996) as well as in the rural Philippines (Estudillo et al. 
2001) and Sumatra (Quisumbing and Otsuka 2001). Maybe educated migrants do not engage 
in agricultural labor because they have no claim to agricultural land, having relinquished 
their entitlement to it by receiving an education.  
    It is also possible that securely titled land is the very land that is most suitable for 
agriculture, which would be attractive to young less-educated migrants whose occupation 
aspirations involve continuing to manage the family farm. It could be that these migrants 
differ fundamentally from more educated migrants in that they only move for relatively short 
periods in order to earn additional income that they use as a supplement to farm income. 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
MIGRANT REMITTANCES AND HOUSEHOLD DIVISION 
 
 
    Early scholarship on the history of household systems and industrial development, which 
mostly focused on European civilization, was divided into two camps (Rosenfeld 2006). The 
first of these believed that pre-industrial societies were characterized by traditional extended 
family households, while the nuclear household structure became the norm following 
industrialization (Calhoun [1919] (1960), Le Play [1872] 1982). The opposing camp argued 
that the pre-modern European family had always been nuclear and its observance in modern 
times represents continuity over time (Hajnal 1965, Laslett 1965, 1972).  
    Lingering questions still persist in more recent debates about the existence of variability in 
household structures in the world’s industrializing regions. Previously it was thought that 
dominant household formation systems (for example, the joint household system found in 
Asia) prevailed in pre-industrial regions and these gave way to simpler households following 
industrialization (Goody 1996, Hajnal 1982, Kertzer 1991). Some scholars have begun to 
question the supposed influence of the industrial revolution on the family (Furstenberg 1966, 
Goode 1963, Hareven 2000, Rosenfeld 2006). Recent work by Rosenfeld (2006) has shown 
that many characteristics of the American family remained unchanged during the years that 
the United States experienced the shift to an urban-industrial base. It was only after the 
1950s, a time of general prosperity succeeding industrialization, that unmarried young adults 
starting living independently from their parents. 
    Despite their absence in many more developed countries, extended families are a primary 
structural feature still found in many developing countries today (Bongaarts 2001, Morgan 
and Rindfuss 1984). In these largely agrarian settings, households play a significant role as 
production units, since family farming is frequently organized around the household. In 
contemporary post-industrial settings, households play a crucial role as consumption units in 
the maintenance and support of their members. Households are fundamental socioeconomic 
institutions found in nearly all societies. They mediate between individuals and larger social 
structures (Boyd 1989, Goldscheider 1995) serving as a significant conduit for a variety of 
individual behaviors including marriage, migration, fertility, and mortality (Entwisle et al 
2005). 
    Eventually all households go through changes in their composition by way of demographic 
and life course processes. For instance, households split when children depart their parental 
home to start new households or when parents move into a new dwelling unit, leaving their 
former residence in the hands of their children. New households form when young people 
marry and reside in their own dwelling unit. Despite their importance throughout the world, 
and their differences in pre- and post-industrial settings, the literature on household processes 
in rural developing contexts remains limited. 
    Perhaps due to stringent data demands, few studies have been conducted that examine the 
process of household splitting in developing contexts. Many existing studies are outdated and 
need to be reevaluated in light of more recent insights from the literature on urban migration 
and development. In this study I examine the relationship between migration and household 
splitting using social survey data from Nang Rong, Thailand, a rural agrarian district that has 
been undergoing rapid economic development in the last several decades.  
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    I link existing literature on the process of household change to research on migrant 
remittances. Remittances are an invaluable source of capital which rural households use to 
alleviate poverty and overcome severe credit constraints in contexts where local wage 
employment opportunities are limited or absent (Durand et al. 1996, Kapur and McHale 
2003, Skeldon 1997). While remittances have been the subject of much recent research, to 
my knowledge this is the first study that connects remittances to the process of household 
change in a developing country context. In subsequent sections of this paper, I review the 
literature on household change followed by a review of the literature on migrant remittances. 
Theories of Household Change 
    Most existing theories of household change were formulated from a developed country 
perspective. After reviewing some of these theories, I consider how they can be modified to 
fit a developing country framework. This involves specifying mechanisms linking household 
change to migration, non-familial employment, and remittances. 
    Household and family demographers pioneered early work on aspects of household 
structure, including household division. The distinguishing feature of this work is its focus on 
households, families, or groups of people living together, rather than on individuals, as units 
of analysis. There is an important distinction between the term family, which refers to a 
group of kin related by blood, marriage, or adoption and the term household, which refers to 
persons, who may or may not be related, living in the same dwelling unit who share 
resources in common (Burch 1979).  
    An early theme in the household demography literature was the relative invariance in the 
structures of households and families across a number of societies past and present, despite 
the popular impression of a wide variety of family forms (Burch 1979). Any attempt to 
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characterize whole societies in terms of their family or household structure is complicated by 
the substantial changes that occur during the lifetime of an individual family and household. 
This realization led to the adoption of the family life cycle perspective, associated with the 
work of Glick (1947, 1987). 
    Glick’s family life cycle conceptualized households as having seven distinctive 
demographic stages: marriage, birth of the first child, birth of the last child, marriage of the 
first child, marriage of the last child, death of the husband (if first), and death of the wife (if 
last). A family typically comes into being when a couple is married. The family gains in size 
with the birth of successive children. Between the time that the last child is born and the first 
child leaves the home, family size remains relatively stable. Eventually, as all the children 
leave for employment or marriage, the size of the family recedes back to the original two 
people. Finally, as one and then the other parent dies, the life cycle comes to an end. 
    By the mid-1970s, the demographic literature documented an increasing complexity in 
family life cycle types resulting from variations away from the traditional family schedule. 
The trend toward delayed marriage, non-marital cohabitation, living in single households, as 
well as the sharp increase in divorce, and high rates of instability in non-marital unions 
(Burch and Matthews 1987, Bumpass 1990) made it clear that the original concept of the 
family life cycle was becoming inadequate (Glick 1989). 
    Researchers studying household formation began to favor the life course perspective, 
which stressed four central themes: 1) the interplay of human lives and historical time, 2) the 
timing of lives, 3) linked or interdependent lives, 4) and human agency in choice making. 
The life course perspective examines individual life course trajectories, including the timing 
and sequencing of role transitions as they are influenced by the interplay of changing 
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historical events, social structural organization, individuals’ position in the social structure, 
and individual biological and psychological development (Elder 1994). 
    The life course perspective changed not only the way that scholars thought about 
household processes, but also the way that they studied them. Using the household as a unit 
of analysis was seen as problematic, particularly in longitudinal studies, because households 
are not stable units over time (Duncan and Hill 1985, Ruggles and Brower 2003). Since 
individual life course differences are among the most important determinants of residential 
behavior, it became apparent that using meso-level units of analysis (like the family or the 
household) made it difficult to isolate these individual-level processes (Ruggles and Brower 
2003).  
    Following developments in theory and method, researchers began to view deviations from 
the traditional family life cycle as involving decisions made by individuals and couples to 
respond to the general question “With whom shall I live?” (Burch and Matthews 1987). 
Individual decisions to share a residence with children or extended family members, which 
resulted in separate living and smaller households, were linked to explanations describing an 
intertwining of economic and ideational changes in tastes and preferences (Burch 1979). 
    Economic explanations attribute the rise of separate living to an upsurge in real income 
(Burch and Matthews 1987, Kuznets 1978, Michael, Fuchs, and Scott 1980). People choose 
to live alone or in smaller households because they could afford to do so. Household 
members found it possible to forgo economies of scale represented by large households. This 
is especially salient given the entry of women into the paid labor force and a switch from an 
agricultural economy to an industrial economy. The former is associated with a reduction in 
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services available in households and the latter created conditions whereby production became 
progressively less linked to the family (Burch and Matthews 1987).  
    Other economic explanations highlighted the role of family income, net of personal 
income, in increasing family extension. Parents often use their resources to help their 
children leave home (Goldscheider and DaVanzo 1989, Goldscheider and Goldscheider 
1993). Indeed, many parental resources, in particular parental income and wealth, are not tied 
to residence in the parental home (Goldscheider and DaVanzo 1989). For instance, the cost 
of higher education, which corresponds to the initial stage in the life course when children 
first move out of their parents’ home, is commonly borne by parents.  
    Explanations that focus on ideational factors emphasize changes in tastes and preferences 
brought about by increased affluence, such as a preference for privacy. Following work by 
Lesthaeghe (1983), a general rise in the valuation of privacy could be the result of a gradual 
unfolding of the full implications of process of secularization and individuation. 
Lesthaeghe’s research integrates demographic theory with social-psychological research on 
human needs (Maslow 1954) and the consequences of “post-materialism” (Inglehart 1981). 
Ideational forces perpetuating family change initially accompanied, but become independent 
of, an increase in affluence and development (Lesthaeghe 1983, Lesthaeghe and Surkyn 
1988). With higher real incomes and a sense of security and welfare provision, individuals 
turned inwards and became concerned with self-development and a sense of personal growth 
and experience. 
    Other ideational explanations link the preference for privacy and separate living to macro-
level normative changes. For example, changes in attitudes brought on by the sexual 
revolution of the 1960s and 1970s increased tolerance for sexual activity among persons 
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other than young and middle-aged married couples. However, parents of single adults may 
have drawn the line at having such activities occur in their own homes, which could have led 
to a greater need for privacy and a desire to live separately (Burch and Matthews 1987). 
Goldscheider and Lawton (1998) argue that as living separately from extended kin became 
more economically feasible, adult coresidence became associated with poverty. Individuals 
thus choose to live separately in order to avoid the stigma of destitution. 
Household Change in Developing Countries 
 
    In what follows, I consider ways in which developed-country theories of household 
change, which stress the effects of rising real income and changes in tastes and preferences, 
can be adapted to developing country contexts. Household change in developing or 
industrializing settings was the subject of interest of early work by Goode (1963), who 
predicted the convergence of family systems around the world to the conjugal type. The 
conjugal family is characterized by a weakening of kinship ties, the dissolution of lineage 
patterns, and the nucleation of the family. While Goode’s theory was insightful, it is 
considered controversial (Bongaarts 2001) and has been the subject of criticism (see 
McDonald 1992).  
    Lavely (1990) identifies three mechanisms linking changes in household structure to 
industrial growth in the developing world: 1) migration, which takes individuals to urban 
areas, where they are isolated from their kin group 2) non-familial employment, which makes 
individuals independent of their family, and 3) exposure to non-traditional or “Western” 
ideas which are opposed to traditional ideologies needed to maintain the functioning of 
extended family residence29.  
                                                 
29 Because of data limitations and the difficulty of studying ideational effects in this paper I mainly focus my 
analysis on the effects of migration and non-familial employment. 
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    These three mechanisms are interrelated. Urban migration is one channel whereby rural 
migrants are potentially exposed to non-traditional or “Western” cultural patterns. More 
importantly, migration is a common way for rural residents in industrializing countries to 
gain non-familial employment, especially given the lack of local wage labor positions 
(McDonald and Kippen 2001, Roberts 1997). By gaining access to wage labor positions, 
migrants have the means to send remittances. This can be beneficial to household members 
left behind, who sometimes face serious challenges in meeting their basic needs or the rising 
consumer expectations that accompany the shift from a subsistence to a monetized economy. 
    As the literature on microcredit makes clear, credit, insurance, and securities markets are 
underdeveloped or absent in many developing countries (Besley 1995). Low-income 
countries develop non-market institutions (credit cooperatives, informal credit and insurance 
arrangements, rotating credit associations, and so on) to deal with these market deficiencies 
(Banerjee et al 1994, Besley 1995, Rosenzweig 1988, Udry 1994). Aside from local non-
market institutions, migration and migrant remittances are one of the most prominent non-
market solutions to absent or underdeveloped markets (Stark 1991).  
    Although exact data on the amount of remittance sent by internal migrants is lacking, the 
amount is likely to be considerable (Entwisle and Tong 2005). The literature shows a fairly 
strong consensus on the use of remittances, regardless of country. Most studies find that 
remittances from migrants to households are spent on recurrent household expenditures, such 
as food, clothing, and health care (Cohen and Rodriguez 2005, Goldring 2004, Koc and Onan 
2004, Taylor 1999). Many analysts agree that there is little money left over for productive 
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investment, although there is some debate about what should be included under the rubric 
“productive investment” (Taylor 1999)30.  
    Massey et al. (1987) argue that migrants’ savings are first channeled toward providing for 
the consumption needs of the home family. Once basic consumption needs are secured, 
migrant families allocate their savings toward investment goals, which include the purchase 
of land or acquisition of a home. This may explain why some studies find that a portion of 
remittances is used for investments such as housing (Adams 1991, Olisi 2004) or other 
productive assets (Durand and Massey 1992, Entwisle and Tong 2005). 
    Remittances alleviate household credit constraints, and being a form of income, they raise 
tastes and preferences. In order to understand how remittances affect household change, it is 
necessary to understand the motives for migration and remittances in the first place. I 
propose several ways in which migration motives can be used to understand household 
splitting. Motivations for sending remittances range from contractual to altruistic and are 
usually understood in the context of household or family decision-making.  
    Altruistic theories of remittance argue that members of households act to improve the 
welfare of every member of their household or family (Agarwal and Horowitz 2002). These 
theories do not rule out self-interested behavior; rather, behavior is seen as responding to the 
needs of other household members (VanWey 2004). Altruistic motives can be understood in 
the broader framework of models which view families and households as corporate units 
(Becker 1974, 1991; Lee at al. 1994). Becker’s (1974, 1993) model of household decision-
making posits a family headed by an altruistic individual (perhaps a patriarch or his widow) 
who controls family resources and allocates them across family members. Resource 
                                                 
30 For instance Taylor (1999) points out that educational expenditures are often not considered productive 
investment, although they improve the human capital of household members and can contribute to productivity. 
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allocation follows a Pareto efficient pattern: no alternative allocation could improve the 
welfare of any given member without reducing the welfare of some other member.   
    It is easy to imagine how receipt of remittances could lead to household splitting under the 
altruism/corporate group framework. Perhaps migrants who leave their rural communities 
and successfully find wage labor positions remit a share of their earnings out of concern for 
the welfare of household members left behind. That money may be allocated across 
household members by a household head. A portion of that money could be used to finance 
the costs of home building (such as the cost of building materials or cost of labor). The 
building of new dwelling units allows household members to live away from their family of 
orientation, although they may still choose to live nearby. 
    Contractual motivations for remittances involve an implicit agreement between migrants 
and households. Contractual obligations can manifest themselves as either contemporaneous 
coinsurance schemes or as inter-temporal investment strategies. Unpredictable and 
potentially serious risks (such as droughts, floods, or famines) are a reality in some parts of 
developing countries. In these areas, insurance markets are often absent or undeveloped, so 
households send migrants to alleviate credit or risk constraints.  
    Coinsurance occurs when a migrant and household take turns insuring each other from 
market fluctuations and risky ventures. For example, the household may provide a safety net 
to insure the migrant against involuntary unemployment, or a migrant may send remittance to 
allow a household to invest in a risky new production technology, such as a high-yield crop 
variety (Stark and Lucas 1988). This is an effective strategy for reducing risk when the 
migrant moves to a location with a different risk profile than origin. 
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    Investment can be initiated by the household.  For instance, the household could bear the 
initial costs of the migrant’s education, which allows the migrant to get a relatively stable, 
high-paying job. This permits the migrant to earn more money, which in turn leads to higher 
remittance to the household. Investment may also be initiated by the migrant, such as when 
the migrant sends money to invest in the education of younger siblings or when the migrant 
remits to the household in anticipation of future property bequests (such as land, housing, or 
goods) from the household (Hoddinot 1994). 
    If remittances come as a response to distress, they are likely to be spent on food, medical 
expenses, seed, and so on. Remittances that are sent with the intention of being invested may 
be spent on housing. Housing investments offer unique advantages in developing regions 
where individuals face few savings opportunities and where productive assets (such as land, 
farm assets) are associated with high risks or low rates of return (Besley 1995). Dwelling 
units or houses are durable, highly visible, and are associated with low risk and monitoring 
requirements (Osili 2004)31.  
    The investment motive for remittance is therefore either related to repayment for earlier 
investment or prepayment for the property that the migrant wishes to one day inherit. Perhaps 
in repayment for the origin household’s initial investment in the migrant’s education, the 
migrant in turn invests in a housing construction project. Maybe the migrant finances the 
building of a new dwelling unit for his or her parents, which allows them to live separately 
from other relatives. Alternatively, a migrant may simply send money for housing in the hope 
of one day returning to the village and taking over the property. Household members at 
                                                 
31 Of course there are drawbacks. Such investments may be illiquid and irreversible in areas where resale and 
rental markets for houses are lacking (Osili 2004). 
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origin may safeguard housing in the meantime, or they may contribute labor for building 
projects in exchange for remittance.  
    It is important to note that determining motivations is difficult in any setting. Usually 
direct data on motive are lacking, and the relative importance of different motivations is 
frequently inferred by the researcher (see for example: Hoddinott 1994, Lucas and Stark 
1985, Stark and Lucas 1988, VanWey 2004). A potential problem with inferring motives 
from data on remittance is that they may not accurately reflect the migrant’s intention in 
sending remittances.  
    Migrants cannot control what home households do with remittance money (Entwisle and 
Tong 2005). Further, remitted money is a fungible asset, and unless it is earmarked for 
specific uses, its use cannot be assumed to reflect the intention behind its remuneration 
(Taylor 1999). Irrespective of motive, theory suggests that remittances can plausibly be 
considered as part of a household decision-making process.  
    One possible way to infer motive is to use insights from research on gender and 
remittances. Following work by Entwisle and Tong (2005) I make inferences about 
motivations underlying remittances by examining whether money sent by male migrants has 
the same effect on splitting as money sent by female migrants. Research has shown that 
women remit more than men, both in Thailand (Curran 1995, Osaki 1999, VanWey 2004) 
and elsewhere (Chiang Huang 1984, Radcliffe 1990). Because women generally retain closer 
ties with kin and are more closely attuned to family obligations relative to men, women’s 
remittance behavior is thought to be more related to altruism (Osaki 2003, VanWey 2004). I 
now consider how general theories linking remittance to household change are mediated by 
contextual factors related to the setting of this study. 
 120
Setting 
    Nang Rong is a small, poor, predominantly rural, district located in Buriram province in 
Northeast Thailand. It is about the size of an eastern U.S. county and is located near the 
Cambodian border. The district was a frontier region during the first six decades of the 20th 
century. People in Nang Rong live in nucleated villages arranged into clusters of dwelling 
units that include an average of about 100 households, although the number can vary 
(Rindfuss et al. 2003).  
    Nang Rong has been the site of an on-going research project since 1984, and data on 
various aspects of social and demographic processes in the district were collected over three 
successive waves spanning 16 years. An examination of population trends over time shows 
that the number of people living in the district remained relatively constant between 1984 and 
2000, but the number of households has increased substantially. Mean household size 
decreased. 
    A full census of all households was collected in a sample of 51 villages in 1984. Baseline 
data from 1984 contained 32,342 individuals living in 5,863 households. The average 
household size was over five people (5.52). Ten years later, the number of individuals living 
in the district actually decreased to 31,128 individuals, while the number of households 
increased to 7,331. The average household size decreased to 4.43. In 2000, the number of 
individuals increased to 34,298, while the number of households increased to 8,635. The 
average household size decreased to just under four (3.97). 
    Traditionally, growth in the number of households was related to the Thai household 
lifecycle. Matrilocal residence is the culturally preferred postnuptial residence pattern 
(Limanonda 1995, Limanonda and Kowantanakul 2002, Knodel et al. 1995, Tan 2002). 
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Given the “loosely structured” nature of Thai society, newly married couples may live 
anywhere, but they are expected to, and commonly do, live with the bride’s parents.  
    The Thai household has a unique lifecycle pattern (see Limanonda 1995, Limanonda and 
Kowantanakul 2002, Knodel et al. 1995, Tan 2002). Traditionally women were expected to 
stay in their parental home until they marry and start their own household. When a daughter 
first marries, her husband moves in with her and her family (Tan 2002). This is a temporary 
arrangement that lasts until either the couple’s first child is born, or the next daughter marries 
and her husband moves into the household (Limanonda 1995, Limanonda and Kowantanakul 
2002). This process continues until a stem family including the elderly parents, the youngest 
daughter, her husband, and their children are the only ones left living in the household.  
    Changes in the size and number of households may also be related to a general increase in 
standard of living in the district. The frontier closed during the 1970s and 1980s. Road 
construction, electrification, telecommunications, and migration substantially changed the 
way that people lived (Curran 1995, Rindfuss et al 2005, VanWey 2003). Figure 2.2 
illustrates changes in economic development. It shows data on the percentage of households 
owning certain assets and having particular amenities across the three data waves32.  
    The data show evidence of rapid economic development and a shift to a monetized 
economy. There is a marked increase in the use of utilities over time. While only a fraction of 
households had water piped into their households in 1984, almost 40 percent of them had it 
by 2000. Electricity, while only available to about a third of households in 1984, was nearly 
universal in 2000. The period between 1984 and 1994 shows a rise in the ownership of 
consumer products, particularly the television. In these ten years, television ownership 
                                                 
32 While data on the number of dwelling units are not available, it is likely that these too have been increasing. 
In fieldwork during the spring of 2005, I noticed that the construction of new dwelling units was a common 
occurrence in many of the villages. 
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increased from under eight percent to nearly 70 percent of households. This was followed by 
an increase of approximately 25 percent in households owning refrigerators between 1994 
and 2000.  
    Ownership of working assets also increased. Itans (multi-purpose agricultural vehicles) 
and especially motorcycles witnessed a steady increase throughout the 16 year period. 
Motorcycles are a typical form of transportation in many developing countries, and can be 
used for any number of purposes, such as getting to and from work and bringing agricultural 
products to market. Automobile (cars, trucks, and pick-ups) ownership remains uncommon in 
the district. 
    It is quite possible that a rise in standards of living is attributable to migration and the 
receipt of remittances, especially since local opportunities for employment outside of 
agriculture are limited. Although some industrial development in the district has led to 
scattered industry, the level of non-agricultural employment is very low (VanWey 2003). 
Some households engage in cottage industries (such as silk weaving, silk worm raising, cloth 
weaving, and charcoal making), but economic returns from these activities are likely to be 
minimal.  
    Paddy rice farming is the main occupation of most villagers, which tends not to be very 
remunerative. Rice growing is rain-fed and relies on an annual monsoon that varies greatly 
from year to year in its timing and amount. Risk associated with rice farming is a fact of life, 
as floods and droughts can have a substantial impact on crop yield (Entwisle and Tong 2005). 
The agricultural cycle has a pronounced seasonality, characterized by a long dry season of 
inactivity. The long dry season, in combination with the risks involved in agriculture, and 
limited opportunities for wage employment encourage villagers to migrate in search of work. 
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    Migrants from the study area and other parts of the Northeast migrate to both rural and 
urban destinations (Chamratrithirong et al. 1995, VanWey 2004). Migration to rural areas is 
thought to be associated with marriage while urban migration is for labor. Major destinations 
for urban migrants include Bangkok, the Eastern Seaboard, and regional cities like Korat33. 
Much of migration in Nang Rong is seasonal or circular migration, and is linked to labor 
demand fluctuations related to the agricultural cycle (Chamratrithirong et al. 1995, Richter, et 
al 1997). 
    Entwisle and Tong (2005) find that remittances in Nang Rong are used for both 
consumption items and on productive assets. Research on remittance use in the Northeast 
mirrors findings in Nang Rong. Most of this research utilizes data from the National 
Migration Surveys (NMS) of 1992 and 1994. Using this data Richter et al. (1997) found that 
almost three-fourths of households in their sample received some form of cash remittances, 
which had a far more significant value than that of goods. Agricultural households in 
particular substantially supplement household earnings with remittances.  
    Remittances contributed significantly towards improving household income (Guest 1998). 
Remittance income tended to be used for household necessities (such as food, clothing, 
household goods, and medical expenses) although in some households it was used for 
housing projects, purchase of agricultural inputs, paying off debt, and investments in 
education (Richter et al. 1997, Guest 1998). Households with migrants were more likely than 
                                                 
33 Korat (formally known as Nakhon Ratchasima) is a nearby provincial city, the largest city in the Northeast.  
The Eastern Seaboard Development Project was a major public-private joint venture carried out in three 
provinces in Thailand (Chonburi, Rayong, and Chacheongsao) during the late 1980s.  The project sought to 
stimulate regional economic development, and to decentralize economic activity away from Bangkok.  The plan 
called for investment in heavy and light industry development, tourism, and deep sea ports which were 
developed for the exploration of natural gas in the Gulf of Thailand (Shatkin 2004). 
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households without migrants to state that building or improving a house was the main use of 
remittances (Guest 1998).  
    In addition to contributing to the material development of rural Thailand, ideas from 
returning or visiting migrants may also inspire new preferences for non-traditional or urban 
residence patterns. This may be especially significant for individuals living in extended 
family households, which are thought to be crowded, and ripe with potential conflicts 
between in-law relatives (Edwards et al. 1994).  
Data 
    To examine the relationship between remittances and household splitting, I use the 1994 
and 2000 waves of Nang Rong data. The 1994 and 2000 waves contain a complete census of 
every household in all sample villages included in the original 1984 data collection. 
Information was obtained on all household members, including those who were permanent 
residents and proxy reports for migrants. The data use two contiguous panels to identify 
migrants. Migrants are operationalized as anyone whose record was listed on a data panel at 
one point in time, who was living away from the village for two or more months in the next 
panel (which was collected at a subsequent point in time).   
    Data were collected on migration, remittances, residential moves within villages, 
household composition, household assets, debt, cottage industries, land ownership, and social 
networks. In addition, life history data were collected for anyone age 18-35 who was located 
in the village in 1994. Life history data include information on individual migration histories 
since age 13 that detail the frequency and duration of migration episodes for anyone residing 
in the village. 
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Basic Approach  
    Using the Nang Rong data, I utilize a combination of descriptive analysis and regression 
modeling to understand the process of household splitting and to relate it to receipt of 
remittances. Following the recommendation of Duncan and Hill (1985) and Ruggles and 
Brower (2003), I use individuals as the unit of analysis and the household as the unit of 
measurement, that is, characteristics of the household are treated as attributes of individuals 
and become explanatory variables along side other characteristics of the individual, such as 
age, sex, or marital status. My interest is in distinguishing different pathways to household 
splitting and new residence formation.  
    Household splitting in Nang Rong can result from either migration out of the village or 
local moves within the village. Moves may correspond to different stages of the Thai 
household life cycle: a mover can either end up in an existing household or a new, previously 
non-existent household. Since household splits (from the perspective of an individual) are 
likely to occur at late adolescent or in adulthood, I limit my sample to ages 18-35 to capture 
the experiences of a cohort of young people who are of an age to experience their first 
household change. I measure household splitting from the perspective of individual members 
and define it as a change over time in an individual’s household membership (a change from 
membership in one household in 1994 to membership in another household in 2000). I limit 
my analysis to individuals who were living in the village in 1994 in order to exclude migrants 
who probably have already changed their residence. 
    Pathways associated with household splits can involve moves into new households or 
existing households. A new household is one that did not exist in the 1994 wave of data, but 
did exist in the 2000 data. An existing household is one that was identified in both the 1994 
 126
and 2000 data. It is likely that new households are newly established independent neolocal 
residences, while existing households are more established households which are likely to be 
extended and may contain three or more generations of family members.  
    I operationalize household change, the dependent variable, by distinguishing the following 
types: 1) individual lives in same household 2) individual moves into a new household within 
the village 3) individual moves into an existing household within the village 4) individual 
moves outside of the village. I consider moves within the village to be local moves and 
moves outside of the village to be migrations. Table 4.1 shows that a little over half (52%) of 
the sample experienced no change in household, while 14 percent moved into a new 
household. A minority, 1.37 percent, moved into an existing household34. Despite the low 
incidence of these moves, I keep them separate from local moves into new households 
because they likely represent different stages in the Thai household lifecycle, a view that is 
supported by my subsequent analysis. The rest of the sample (32%) migrated outside of the 
village, hence experiencing a change in household.  
    All independent variables are measured in 1994. I use a lag between independent and 
dependent variables to avoid using post-movement characteristics to predict changes in 
residence. Indications of remittances (such as the amount of money received) are the key 
independent variables of interest, and remittance is measured as money sent anytime within a 
year prior to the implementation of the household survey. All other variables serve as 
controls. 
    Remittance data were only collected for migrants, who are defined as individuals who 
moved out of the village between the 1984 and 1994 data panels. Therefore, I further restrict 
                                                 
34 Because this category only contains 67 cases, some caution should be used in making inferences about these 
individuals. 
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my sample to only individuals from households who were eligible to receive remittances. For 
remittances sent in 1994, I limit my analytical sample to households found in both the 1984 
and 1994 survey, because only these households had any migrants, and thus only they had 
the opportunity to receive remittances. Households present in 1994 that did not have a record 
in the preceding panel and are excluded from the analysis. I also restrict my sample to only 
records that have complete cases.35
    There is one additional issue that needs to be discussed. Migrants are not necessarily all 
migrating to start a new household. Some migrations may be temporary seasonal or cyclical 
moves, which could end in return to the origin household. Perhaps these migrants are 
working as construction workers during the agricultural off-season. As comparatively less 
can be inferred about the household formation of migrants’ households, I will focus more 
attention on local movers, although migrants who migrated between 1994 and 2000 will still 
remain in the analysis to avoid sample selection bias. However, individuals who migrated 
between 1984 and 1994 will be excluded from the analysis because many of them probably 
have already started a new household. 
Method 
    Since the dependent variable is a four-category nominal variable, I use a multinomial logit 
model. For the multinomial logit model, with categories m = 1,…, M – 1, we have: 
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    Where β′ is a vector of regression coefficients including the intercept, and Xi is a matrix of 
independent variables for each individual i. Using a logit link function to match the 
probability of being in each category m to the linear predictor, the dependent variable 
                                                 
35 Listwise deletion eliminated 234 cases, which account for almost five percent of the original sample. 
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becomes the natural log-odds of a respondent being in any category of residential change m. 
In order to get unique solutions for each set of regression coefficients, one of the response 
categories is set as a reference category (see Long, 1997: 152 - 153 for details). For ease of 
interpretation, final regression results are presented both in the untransformed logit scale and 
as odds ratios.  
    The unit of analysis is the individual (i.e. young adults residing in Nang Rong households 
that had at least one migrant). Multiple individuals can live in each household and multiple 
households can be located in each village. Thus the data are clustered and are not 
independent of each other. It is important to account for clustering, because it artificially 
lowers standard errors associated with coefficients, thereby overestimating t-statistics and 
overstating the significance of estimates. I use a robust standard error correction (see White, 
1980 for details) to correct for the clustering of individual records within household records. 
Operationalization of Independent Variables 
    Migrant remittances are the key independent variables of interest. Remittance data on both 
migrant-to-household and household-to-migrant transfers were collected in the 1994 
household survey. Separate questions asked whether each migrant sent money during the 
previous year and whether money was sent to any migrant in this time. I am mainly 
interested in the amount of remittances and the number of migrants sending remittances (or 
the number of migrants being sent remittances). Information about the amount of remittances 
was collected in broad categories to reduce recall bias. The categories are: 1-1,000 baht36, 
1,001-3,000 baht, 3,001-5,000 baht, 5,001-10,000 baht, 10,000-20,000 baht, and over 20,000 
baht).  
                                                 
36 The baht is the Thai unit of currency; in 1994 one US dollar was approximately equal to 25 baht.  
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    Following earlier work in Nang Rong (Entwisle and Tong 2005, Hull 2005) I develop an 
estimate of the amount of money remitted by using the midpoint of each category, except for 
the highest category, for which I use the lower bound. The overall estimate was obtained by 
weighting the number of remitters sending each amount by the midpoint of the category. 
Top-coding the highest category produces error because the true value of this category is 
underestimated. To test the robustness of this measure, I also include other measures of 
remittance, including the number of migrant-to-household remitters (and the number of 
household-to-migrant remittance occasions). 
    Greater amounts of migrant-to-household remittances as well as larger numbers of 
remitting migrants are expected to alleviate credit constraints which make it possible for 
families to afford housing units, permitting household splitting. Household-to-migrant 
remittances are included mainly as a control variable measuring the households’ cash flow. 
Since remittance by women is thought to be related to altruistic motivations, following work 
by Entwisle and Tong (2005) I also include separate counts by gender of the number of 
migrant-to-household remitters. This should help illuminate the motivations for sending 
remittances.  
    Table 4.2 contains descriptive statistics on all independent variables. The table shows that 
the amount of migrant-to-household remittance ranged from zero to 100,000 baht with a 
mean of over 4,000 baht ($160). The amount of household-to-migrant remittance was 
considerably lower, which is consistent with work by VanWey (2004) who shows that this 
money is mainly sent to students. It ranged from zero to approximately 67,000 baht with an 
average of over 600 baht. The average number of remitters to the household was also slightly 
higher than the average number of migrants receiving remittances from the household 
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(compare 0.79 to 0.19). Of the number of migrants sending remittance to the household, 
nearly an equivalent number of women and men sent remittances on average. 
    The remaining variables are control variables, including individual-level measures of 
demographic characteristics, marital status and spouse location, variables measuring 
residence in an extended household, measures of household composition, and measures of 
household economy. I briefly describe key control variables.  
    Demographic characteristics include previous migration history, age, whether the 
respondent was a new household member in 1994, education, and occupation. Migration 
history comes from the life history data. Although remittance data are not available in the life 
history data, this would have potentially been an important variable because it may have 
indicated the degree to which an individual who ever migrated earned money which could be 
used to finance a change in residence. Such money could have been sent to the household as 
a form of investment, which may be used to finance an individual’s own future move into an 
independent residence. 
    I attempt to capture this effect indirectly by including variables related to an individual’s 
migration experience. In preliminary analysis I examined the zero-order correlations between 
household splitting and various measures of individual migration including: the number of 
migration episodes, and the duration of migration episodes. None of these variables had a 
statistically significant effect on local moves into new households or into existing 
households. In my final models I only include a dummy variable indicating whether the 
individual was ever a circular migrant. Table 4.2 shows that less than half (41 percent) of 
individuals had engaged in circular migration since age 13. 
 131
    Whether the respondent was a new household member in 1994 is a potentially important 
life course variable. This variable measures whether the individual moved into the household 
anytime between 1984 and 1994. If Thai couples are following the traditional Thai household 
postnuptial residence pattern, they first move in with the brides’ family, and then they start 
their own neolocal residence. This variable therefore should be positively associated with 
local moves into a new household. Table 4.2 shows that 23 percent of individuals were new 
household members by 1994.  
    Education and occupation are measured as a series of dummy variables. For education, I 
distinguish between those who have greater than a primary school education, only a primary 
school education, and less than a primary school education. Having only a primary school 
education is the modal category (exactly half of the respondents have this much education) 
with greater than primary school being the least common category (13 percent of 
respondents). For occupation, I distinguish between those in agricultural occupations, those 
who are students or unemployed, and those who are employed in non-agriculture. The large 
majority (84 percent) work in agriculture, probably as paddy rice farmers.  
    I combine marital status and spouse location into a set of indicator variables. I distinguish 
between those who are married and have a spouse living in the origin household or village37, 
married and have a spouse who is a migrant, post-married (widowed, divorced, or separated) 
or spouse location is unknown, and those who are never married. Marriage marks an 
important life course event, and is likely to be a strong predictor of residential changes in the 
direction of either starting a new independent household or of moving in with the bride’s 
family. Table 4.2 shows that about half (48 percent) of the sample are married and have a 
                                                 
37 Individuals who have a spouse living in another household in the same village are rare. Rather than deleting 
them from the sample, I combined them with individuals who have a spouse living in the origin household. 
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spouse living in the household or village. The next most common category is not currently 
married (41 percent). 
    Co-residence variables include measures of whether an individual lives in a vertically 
extended household (including three generations of family members: grandparents, parents, 
and children) prior to residential change. I include dummy variables for whether an 
individual was co-residing with both parents, just the father, or just the mother. I include 
parents-in-law as well as biological parents. If residential moves are occurring from 
vertically extended households to nuclear households, then co-residence with parents should 
be positively related to residential changes. From Table 4.2, it can be seen that living with 
both parents was the most common residential arrangement in 1994 (59 percent of the 
sample). Living with neither parent was just as common as living with just the mother (each 
account for 18 percent of the sample).  
    Co-residence with one’s children is also related to life course events. Individuals generally 
live with more children after starting their own independent residence. I include a count of 
the number of children (of the people in my sample) living in a household. I expect that the 
number of children should be negatively related to residential moves, because those who 
have already started their own independent household are more likely to be living with larger 
numbers of children than those who are just beginning the family-building process. The 
number of children ranges from zero to six, with an average of just under one child. 
    Household crowding may be an important impetus for moving out of a household. 
Although data on the size of a dwelling unit, the number of rooms, or subjective measures of 
crowding or lack of privacy are not available, I try to proxy crowding indirectly by 
examining the effect of household composition. Household composition variables include 
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counts of the number of unmarried household members age 13-60 and the number of 
subfamilies (married couples) living in the household. It is likely that single individuals and 
subfamilies have different space requirements, which may contribute to crowding. Edwards 
et al. (1994) argue that married couples require less space than single adults, so I expect the 
number of subfamilies to be more related to household splits.  
    Since there are a number of other ways in which households can generate income in 
addition to remittances, I control for measures of household economy. Among these I include 
household debt, participation in cottage industries (cloth weaving, silk weaving and silk 
worm raising), charcoal production, cassava planting, an index of household wealth, and the 
amount of land owned.  
    As direct data on household wealth are not available, I follow work by Filmer and Pritchett 
(2001) and create a household wealth index, based on the presence of various consumer 
durables. The procedure uses principal components analysis. This index uses data on the 
number of black and white televisions, color televisions, VCRs, refrigerators, Itans 
(agricultural trucks), cars/trucks/pickups, motorcycles, and sewing machines. In addition, I 
include dummy variables for whether a household cooks with electricity or gas, and has 
windows with wood shutters, glass panes, or bug screens. 
    Each household is grouped into one of three categories, based on its overall household 
wealth index score. Since wealth often tends to be clustered at the top of a wealth 
distribution, I include relatively fewer households in the top of the distribution than at the 
bottom. Specifically, households in the lowest third will be considered to be at the “bottom,” 
those in the 34th to 79th percentiles will be considered “middle,” and the highest fifth will be 
considered to be at the “top.” 
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    A disproportionate share of households in the various wealth categories results because of 
differences between the population of households used in the construction of the index and 
the sample used for the present analysis. In calculating household wealth, I used all 
households from all sample villages, while my analytical sample only uses households with 
individuals in the age range 18 – 35 who are residing in the village. Table 4.2 shows that 22 
percent of the analysis sample households are in the top quintile of household wealth, while 
39 percent of analysis sample households are in the bottom wealth category, and another 39 
percent are in the middle category.  
    To account for sources of social support and aid coming from outside the household, I also 
control for the number of direct sibling connections between the household and other 
households in the village. Variables for the sibling network were constructed from survey 
items in which respondents age 18–35, who reside in the household, were asked to provide 
the names and addresses of living siblings residing in other households in the village. 
Results 
    Before describing results of the regression analysis, I present descriptive statistics on 
household characteristics for local movers. I compare the characteristics of the movers’ 
household in 1994 (before the residential change) to household characteristics in 2000 (after 
the residential move). Results generally support the expectation that residential changes 
involve moves from relatively large, vertically extended households, to smaller, nuclear 
households. 
    Figure 4.1 shows the change in household size between the 1994 and 2000 household. 
Local movers tend to be living in smaller households after their residential change. Most of 
these households contain four or fewer people, which may suggest a couple is living with 
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their children. Before their move, most of these individuals were living in larger households 
of around five to seven people. 
    Table 4.3 shows a bivariate table of co-residence with elder parents (including in-laws) for 
local movers in 1994 by co-residence status in 2000. The general pattern is clear: regardless 
of whether an individual lived with both parents, only their father, or only their mother in 
1994 (before residential change), overwhelmingly the individual does not share a residence 
with either parent in 2000 (after the residential change). This suggests that local movers are 
moving out of their natal home (or their spouse’s natal home) and into an independent 
nuclear household.  
    More support for the notion that local movers are starting independent nuclear households 
comes from data on marriage and co-residence with spouse. In 1994 (before the residential 
change) over a quarter (26 percent) of local movers were not married. By 2000 (after the 
residential change) only a minority remained unmarried (1.72 percent). Bivariate analysis 
confirms that most unmarried local movers in 1994 were no longer single in 2000. Local 
movers were more likely to co-reside with their spouses after the residential change. In 1994, 
under two-thirds (60 percent) of local movers were co-residing with their spouse. After a 
change in residence, almost all (approximately 90 percent) were doing so.  
    The data also suggest that local movers are co-residing with more children after their 
residential change compared to before the change (see Figure 4.2). In 1994, almost half were 
co-residing with no children, and most of the rest only one or two children. In 2000, just 
under ten percent were co-residing with no children, and the majority between one and two 
children. It is likely that residential changes are associated with the family-building stage of 
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the life course. Local movers are starting new independent households around the time that 
they are having children. 
    Descriptive results support the notion that a local move ending in existing households 
corresponds to a different stage of the Thai household life cycle than a move into a new 
household. A move into an existing household may correspond with the initial co-residence 
between a couple and the bride’s household just following marriage. A move into a new 
household may correspond with a couple’s decision to move into a neolocal household, 
which is the next stage of the Thai household life cycle. 
    Table 4.4 shows descriptive statistics for all independent variables presented separately for 
local movers who moved into a new household and for those who moved into an existing 
household. Several differences across these two groups are worth noting. First, individuals 
moving into new households were far more likely to be new household members in the 1994 
survey (compare 34 versus 7 percent). This suggests that before their residential change, 
individuals who eventually moved into a new household were more likely to have made a 
prior move into an existing household sometime between 1984 and 1994. This is consistent 
with expectations of the Thai household life cycle.  
    Second, the effect of marital status is worth noting. Of those who moved into an existing 
household, 91 percent were not married before their move, compared to only 21 percent of 
those who moved into a new household. This again points to different stages of the Thai 
household life cycle. Those who moved into an existing household were on the verge of the 
initial stage of the household life cycle. Most probably got married and moved in with the 
bride’s household in the course of their residential change. Indeed, moving into the bride’s 
family was a considerably more popular choice than moving in with the husband’s family: 
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the former arrangement was found in about 70 percent of cases, while the latter in only 13 
percent of cases. Many of those who move into a new household are already married, and 
probably will start a new independent household upon moving. This is consistent with a later 
stage of the Thai household life cycle. 
    Those who are moving into a new household have a higher mean number of children than 
those are moving into an existing household. This suggests that the latter are in a more 
advanced stage of family-building than the former. Those moving into existing households 
are more likely to be male, as the following text table illustrates: 
Sex Did not Move 
Moved into 
New 
Household 
Moved into 
Existing 
Household 
Migrated Out 
of Village Total 
Female 59.13 57.16 22.39 41.38 52.59 
Male 40.87 42.84 77.61 58.62 47.41 
Total 100.00 
N=2552 
100.00 
N=691 
100.00 
N=67 
100.00 
N=1591 
100.00 
N=4900 
 
This is consistent with matrilocal postnuptial residence customs in Thailand. Those moving 
into new households are less likely to be males, because these moves probably involve men 
moving with their spouses.   
    The effect of age is also worthy of comment. Although age differences in Table 4.4 appear 
to be three years, a look at the age distribution of both these groups (see Figure 4.3), shows 
that those moving into existing households are younger. Their age distribution is skewed 
toward late adolescence, particularly ages 19 and 21. This is also consistent with the notion 
that this group is in an earlier stage in their life course.  
    Turning to the results of the regression analysis, there is broad support for a remittance 
effect as well as a household life cycle explanation. I estimate three separate models each 
containing different remittance variables. The first model (see Table 4.5) shows that the 
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amount of migrant-to-household remittance is positively and significantly associated with a 
move into a new household. This is consistent with the idea that remittances alleviate capital 
constraints which may make it easier for individuals to finance residential moves.  
    It is noteworthy that the remittance effect is not significant for moves into existing 
households. This suggests that remittance money is particularly vital for couples moving into 
new independent households rather than newlyweds initially moving in with the bride’s 
family. This is reasonable, given that couples starting their own household most likely need 
money for housing, while those moving in with the bride’s family do not. 
    The second model (see Table 4.6) shows that the number of remitting migrants is also 
positively associated with moves into new households. This suggests that these results are 
robust to different remittance variable specifications. The third model (see Table 4.7) adds 
information on gender specific migrant-to-household remittances. Results show that moves 
into new households are associated with remittances from females, but not from males. As 
the number of female remitters increases, so does the likelihood of moving into a new 
household. Given arguments that female remittances in Thailand are more likely to be 
motivated by altruistic motivations relative to male remittances (Osaki 2003, VanWey 2004), 
this finding lends support to an altruist model of remittance and household splitting. 
    Interestingly, the amount of household-to-migrant remittances is also positively related to 
residential moves into new households in the first model in Table 4.5. This may suggest that 
households with sufficient cash flow can afford to finance household splits and still send 
money to migrants. It is also noteworthy that the effect of ever being a circular migrant is not 
significant. Those who have ever migrated may have done so for a short time period to work 
in the paid labor force. They may have earned enough money to finance their own residential 
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move. Unfortunately, direct data on wages and remittance during a circular migration spell 
are not available.  
    Researchers studying the effect of remittances (Entwisle and Tong 2005, Taylor 1999) 
point out that the impacts of migration and remittances should be assessed relative to what 
origin household’s circumstances would look like without migration. Individuals and 
households select themselves into and out of migration through an endogenous process 
(Taylor 1999). Selectivities in whether households send migrants, and whether migrants 
remit, can confound inferences, especially when analysis is based on cross-sectional data 
(Entwisle and Tong 2005).  
    Several studies in Thailand have found that migrants are more likely to come from and 
remit to poorer households (Guest 1998, Osaki 2003, Richter et al. 1997, VanWey 2004). If 
baseline differences between households who send migrants and those who do not send 
migrants exist, the effects of remittance will be overstated (Entwisle and Tong 2005). I 
attempt to evaluate the whether baseline differences in household wealth are related to 
receipt of remittances.  
    I construct another index of household wealth using principal components analysis on 
available data from 1984 (which is an indication of initial wealth before migration occurred). 
To construct the index I use the following measures: the number of consumer and productive 
assets owned by the household (including televisions, refrigerators, water pumps, itans, pick-
ups/trucks, motorcycles), whether the household cooks with electricity or gas versus some 
other form of energy, the type of dwelling unit owned by the household (either a hut, a 
single-story dwelling, or one of the following: a wood house on stilts with concrete 
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foundation, a brick house, a two story house), and the amount of land owned by the 
household.  
    I use a series of simple linear regressions to relate household wealth in 1984 to 1994 
migrant-to-household remittance measures (including the number of remitters and the total 
amount of remitters). Results (not shown) indicate that the 1984 wealth index is not 
significantly related to receipt of remittances in 1994. This suggests that the remittance effect 
is not overstated because of initial differences in wealth between households that existed 
prior to migration. 
    Results of the remaining variables agree with descriptive statistics and support a household 
life cycle or life course interpretation. Age is negatively related to a move into a new 
household. However, this also is not a consistent effect across models and is probably due to 
chance. All categories of married individuals are more likely to move into a new household 
compared to single individuals. This is consistent with the second stage of the Thai 
household life cycle, in which marriage and movement into the bride’s household precede the 
start of an independent nuclear household. The magnitude of these effects is considerable, 
ranging from over five to over eight times the odds of single migrants moving into a new 
household. 
    Having both parents in the household increases the odds that an individual will move into 
an existing household. This is consistent with descriptive results, which reveal that local 
movers are leaving large extended households and are moving into smaller nuclear 
households. The effect is also quite strong. Compared to those who were not co-residing with 
either parent, the odds of moving into a new household for those co-residing with both 
parents are 1.27 times higher (or 2.27 times as high). 
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    The effect of the number of children is also consistent with expectations: it is negatively 
related to moves into new households. Those with a larger number of children have probably 
already started their own independent nuclear household, while those with a few children are 
just on the verge of the family-building stage of the life course. 
    The number of unmarried household members and the number of subfamilies both have 
positive effects on movement into new households. These effects do little to help evaluate the 
effect of household crowding. However, for movement into an existing household, the 
number of unmarried household members is the only significant effect. As this number 
increases, so does the odds of moving into an existing household. This is consistent with the 
literature on household crowding in Thailand (Edwards et al. 1994), which argues that single 
individuals take up more space than married couples. The effect of the number of subfamilies 
on movement into new households is also consistent with the Thai household life cycle, 
which suggests that the movement of the next daughter and her husband perpetuates the 
move of any couples that are already living with the bride’s household. 
    Other variables that predict moves into existing households include the effect of gender. 
Males are more likely to move into an existing household compared to females. The odds of 
males moving are three times higher than the odds of females moving. This effect agrees 
with descriptive statistics and with martilocal postnuptial residence customs which proscribe 
that men should move in with the bride’s household during the initial stages of the household 
lifecycle.  
    Another consistent finding is that married individuals whose spouse lives in the household 
or village are less likely to move into an existing household. This too is consistent with 
descriptive statistics and the idea that moving into an existing household corresponds with 
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the initial stage of the household life cycle just following marriage. Those who are already 
married probably have already gone through this stage and hence are less likely to do so in 
comparison to those who are unmarried. 
Discussion and Conclusion 
    In this paper I examine the determinants of household splitting in Thailand, a developing 
country experiencing the shift to an urban industrial economy. I go beyond earlier work by 
linking the process of residential change to a household’s receipt of migrant remittances. 
Remittances sent from migrants to households are found to be a significant determinant of 
household splits, perhaps because they help alleviate credit constraints on necessary 
preconditions to residential change, such as house building. This may be related to the 
migrants sending of remittances in response to family needs, to maintaining or improving the 
lifestyle of those in the origin household. 
    Gender differences in remittance sending behavior suggest that remittances sent 
altruistically are perpetuating moves, particularly those associated with later stages of the 
Thai household life cycle. It is likely that households behave like corporate units and allocate 
remittances across family members. While a portion of remittance money could be spend on 
recurrent costs, perhaps some of the money goes to financing the movement of couples out of 
vertically extended households, into independent nuclear households. 
    The receipt of remittances may be related more generally to rising standards of living 
within Nang Rong. Migrants may contribute not only to changing material circumstances but 
also to changes in preferences for smaller families and more privacy. Migration experiences 
away from home increase the autonomy of youth, who, through visits or other contacts, may 
inspire changes in the aspirations of those left behind. Without direct data on attitudes, this is 
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difficult to determine. Although migration and remittances may be contributing to some 
changes in the district, there is little evidence that the traditional Thai household life cycle 
has been affected. The analysis is consistent with the Thai household life cycle, in which 
couples move in with the bride’s household in the initial stage of the cycle. In a later stage 
they start their own independent household.   
    Further research could focus more attention on the relationship between remittances and 
housing improvements. Work by Rindfuss et al. (2006) has found that migrant remittances 
are positively associated with housing quality, which may suggest that remittances are being 
used to finance housing improvements and construction projects. For further analysis, more 
detailed data is needed to link the intervening mechanism between remittance transfers, 
housing projects, and household formation processes. 
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APPENDIX 1 
 
CREATING A WEALTH INDEX FROM HOUSEHOLD 
 ASSETS USING PRINCIPAL COMPONENTS ANALYSIS 
 
 
    While the Nang Rong data do not contain information on individual income or household 
consumption expenditures, data were collected about household ownership of various 
consumer durables or assets. These variables can be used to create an index of assets that is a 
proxy for household wealth. In creating such an index, choosing an appropriate weight to 
attribute to each asset maybe difficult. To calculate these weights, I use principal components 
analysis (PCA), a well-known technique for reducing the dimensionality of a data set. 
    PCA is a technique that extracts a few uncorrelated linear combinations of an original set 
of variables that captures most of the information in the original variables (Dunteman 1989). 
Suppose we had a set of p variables, representing the ownership of assets by each household. 
PCA transforms these p wealth indicator variables, which can be characterized as a p 
dimensional random vector x (x1, x2, … xp) into a one-dimensional wealth index z, using the 
following equation: 
 z = u1x1 + u2x2 + … + upxp               (1)  
    The weights (u1, u2, … up) are determined mathematically by maximizing the variation of 
the linear composite. Furthermore, the principal components are ordered with respect to their 
variation so that the first principal component accounts for the most variation in the original 
variables, and each subsequent principal component accounts for less and less of the 
remaining variation. 
    The first principal component is the line of closest fit to the j observations in the p 
dimensional variable space defined by the asset variables. It minimizes the squared distance 
(defined in a direction perpendicular to the line) of the j observations from the line in the 
variable space representing the first principal component. The p principal components can be 
expressed in equation form: 
 z1 = u11x1 + u12x2 + … + u1pxp
 z2 = u21x1 + u22x2 + … + u2pxp 
 … 
 zp = up1x1 + up2x2 + … + uppxp               (2) 
or in matrix form: 
 zi = ui′x 
where ui is a weight vector (ui1, ui2, … , uip) associated with the ith principal component, 
which can be calculated separately for every household j. Also, x is a p × 1 vector of original 
variables. The main statistics resulting from PCA are the variable weight vector ui associated 
with each principal component and its corresponding variance, λi (Dunteman 1989). 
    PCA finds a weight matrix U that maximizes U′RU, given the constraint that U′U = I, the 
identity function. This method is based on a result from matrix algebra involving a p × p 
symmetric, nonsingular matrix R, a correlation matrix of asset variables. Because the units in 
which the original variables are measured are often arbitrary, and variables with large 
variances automatically get large weights in the principal component, a correlation matrix is 
often preferred to a covariance matrix (Dunteman 1989). 
    As detailed in Jackson (1991), the matrix λ can be calculated by premultiplying and 
postmultiplying R by a weight vector U such that: 
 U′RU = λ                 (3) 
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    The diagonal elements of λ (λ1, λ2, … λp) are called characteristic roots or eigenvalues, 
and they are equal to the variance of each respective principal component. The off-diagonals 
of λ are all equal to zero. The columns of U, u1, u2, … up are called characteristic vectors or 
eigenvectors of R. Eigenvalues can be obtained by solving for λ in the characteristic 
equation:   
 | R – λI | = 0                 (4) 
where I is the identity matrix. After solving for λ, one can obtain eigenvectors by finding the 
solution of the equations: 
  [R – λI]ti = 0                 (5) 
and 
 ui = 
ii
i
tt
t
′                  (6) 
for i = 1,2, …, p. 
    Upon solving for these eigenvectors, one can make up the matrix U, with the ith row 
corresponding to the elements of the eigenvector associated with the ith eigenvalue: 
 U = [u1 ¦ u2 ¦ … ¦ up].                (7) 
    This can be used to express the functional relationship between principal components, the 
weight vector, and the original variables more succinctly as: 
 z = U′x                (8) 
    where z is a p × p matrix of principal components, U′ is a p × p matrix of eigenvectors and 
x is a p column vector of original variables (Jackson 1991).  While there are p principal 
components of the original p variables, it is the first principal component that captures the 
most variation.  Thus, following work by Filmer and Pritchett (2001), I use only the 
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eigenvectors from the first principal component as weights in creating a wealth index for 
each household j, which can be expressed as: 
z11 = u11x1j + u12x2j + … + u1pxpj 
…     j = 1,…,J 
z1j = u11x1j + u12x2j + … + u1pxpj 
    The critical assumption is that household wealth is what causes the most common 
variation in asset variables (Filmer and Pritchett 2001).
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APPENDIX 2 
 
EXAMINING SAMPLE SELECTION BIAS DUE TO THE 
EXCLUSION OF HOUSEHOLDS NOT GROWING RICE 
 
 
    To test the possibility that excluding households that do not growing rice leads to 
selectivity bias, I estimate both a Heckman sample selection model and a model that includes 
the entire sample where migrants from non-rice-growing households are constrained to have 
not helped with the rice harvest.  
    The Heckman model is two-step sample selection model (see Heckman, 1979 for details). 
It simultaneously estimates two equations. The first is a selection equation, in which the 
outcome of interest (in this case) is whether or not the household grew rice. The second 
equation is the one of substantive interest, in which the outcome variable measures whether 
or not a migrant came back to help with the rice harvest. The standard Heckman model can 
be written: 
 Y1i = β1X1i + U1i        (1)  
Y2i = β2X2i + U2i       (i = 1,…., I). (2) 
    Where Xji is a vector of exogenous variables, βj is a vector of parameters. The standard 
assumption is that both U1i and U2i are distributed normally with a mean of zero and a 
standard deviation of σ. In addition, it is argued that sample selection causes the set of 
unmeasured variables that are related to the selection criteria to be correlated with the set of 
unmeasured variables related to the substantive outcome. The degree to which this is true can 
be determined by looking at ρ, which is the correlation between U1i and U2i.  
    When ρ is equal to zero, unmeasured variables in the selection equation are unrelated to 
unmeasured variable in the substantive equation, and regression coefficients are unbiased. 
However, in cases in which ρ is not equal to zero, the Heckman selection model allows us to 
use information from migrants of non-rice growing households to estimate consistent, 
asymptotically efficient estimates for all parameters in the model.  
    In addition to the Heckman model, I estimate a model that uses the entire sample of 
migrants (including those from households that do not grow rice). This uses a logit 
specification, and is identical to the model featured in the paper, except for the differences in 
sample. Frequency distributions for these models can be found in Table A2.1. From the table, 
it can be seen that nine percent of migrants in the full sample help with the rice harvest 
compared to eleven percent of the analysis sample. Also, a large minority, around one-fifth 
(18%) of households, do not grow rice. 
    Table A2.2 shows descriptive statistics for all independent variables. Descriptive statistics 
are presented for the full sample (including households that did not grow rice) and the 
analysis sample (which excludes households that did not grow rice). It also includes variables 
used in the selection equation of the Heckman model.  
For the selection equation, which determines whether or not a household grew rice, I include 
the following covariates, all of which are measured in 1994: a dummy variable indicating 
whether the household was landless; a dummy variable indicating whether the household 
owned agricultural equipment; a count of the number of alter households who grow rice 
having a sibling network tie to the ego household; the age of the household head; a dummy 
variable for whether someone in the household has a relatively high paying wage job; the 
number of people of working (13 – 60) and non-working age living in the household; the 
number of individuals who migrated from the household between 1984 and 1994; dummy 
variables indicating whether the household participated in any of several cottage industries 
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(silk weaving, silk worm raising, cloth weaving, charcoal making); a dummy variable 
indicating whether the household grew cassava; and the percent of land that is well suitable 
for growing rice in a five kilometer radial buffer around the village center.  
    Table A2.2 shows that differences between the full sample and the analysis sample with 
respect to values of independent variables are minor, which does not suggest selection bias. 
Selection bias can be formally determined by observing whether the ρ coefficient, estimated 
by the Heckman model, is statistically significant. Recall that when ρ is equal to zero, the set 
of unmeasured variables that are related to selection are not related to the outcome of 
substantive interest. Results from Table A2.3 show that ρ is not statistically different from 
zero. Therefore, assuming the Heckman model is correctly specified, regression coefficients 
in the substantive equation should be unbiased.  
    It should be noted, however, that the Heckman model has been criticized for several 
reasons. A common complaint against the model is that variables in the selection equation 
could also affect the dependent variable in the substantive equation. However, specifying 
these paths eventually leads to identification problems with the model. Another complaint 
comes from research findings that the Heckman model performs no better than uncorrected 
ordinary least squares in simulation studies (Stolzenberg and Relles 1990)38. Therefore I also 
estimate a model that uses the full sample in order to test the robustness of my findings.   
                                                 
38 Stolzenberg and Relles (1990) empirically evaluated the performance of the Heckman estimator under 
conditions in which the normality assumption held, censoring was “severe” (set at ten percent), and samples 
were relatively small (n = 500). Having established the values of their regression parameters a priori, the 
authors generated data using a Monte Carlo simulation. The authors generated 100 random data sets, with an 
average selection probability of 10 percent for each data set. They then modeled the data, while varying the 
values of design parameters such as the regression R2, selection R2, squared correlation between regression and 
selection independent variables, and squared correlation between regression and selection error terms. The 
authors found that, on average, Heckman’s method performs no better than uncorrected ordinary least squares, 
sometimes exacerbating bias, and worsening the accuracy of estimates almost as often as it improves them.  
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    From Table A2.4, it can be seen that results for the full sample are similar to that of the 
results for the featured model, which uses an analysis sample excluding households that do 
not grow rice. Results are largely similar, with a few exceptions, especially with regard to the 
presence of spouses and parents. 
    One finding that contrasts the analytical sample findings is the effect of both parents. 
Among the full sample, migrants are more likely to help with the rice harvest if both parents 
live in the household, relative to cases in which neither parent lives in the household. This 
effect is questionable however. The difference between the full sample, in which the effect 
was found, and the analytical sample (a sub-sample of only rice-growing households), in 
which the effect was not found, is due to the exclusion of households that do not grow rice in 
the latter sample. Thus the difference in results has to be due to households that do not grow 
rice being included in the full sample, whose migrants are all constrained to have not helped 
with the harvest. If none of these migrants helped with the rice harvest, how can it be that the 
presence of both parents in these households made it more likely that they would return?  
This finding is likely to be due to chance, and it is not robust across different models. 
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